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Sudan experienced severe food shortages and famines during the 1970s and
1980s. For a country known for its vast agricultural resources, this is both unfortu-
nate and ironic. This research report explores the basic factors that contributed to
the recurrence of this phenomenon and identifies policies and actions for avoiding
famines and achieving sound and sustainable food policies.
The study demonstrates the complexity of policy for famine prevention, which
encompasses macroeconomic reform, promotion of agricultural production and
technological change, market development, employment promotion, and interven-
tions for health and nutrition. The researchers extensively investigated all these
aspects from primary field data gathered before and after the 1984-85 famine as
well as from secondary data. The analysis clearly indicates that famines in Sudan
are more often than not a result of long-term policy failures, and in environments
of political unrest and weak infrastructure, droughts serve as a trigger to famine.
Famines appear as short-term crises, but this study and a parallel one by IFPRI
in Ethiopia show that they arise out of long-term developments in policy, economic
strategy, and ecology. This calls for research, such as this study, on these long-term
factors, not just research into the short-term aspects of crises.
The persistence of famine in Sudan in the 1990s shows that such long-term
research has application to current situations and could be of great assistance to
Sudan and to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with similar conditions. IFPRI
hopes that policymakers will regard the research findings and the recommendations
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Famine has persisted in Sudan through the 1980s and into the 1990s. Drought
is one of its immediate causes and must be understood in a broad context if famine
vulnerability is to be reduced with appropriate policy. This study asks, What are the
determinants of famine in Sudan? What role does drought play? Who is affected?
And further, What has the experience been with private action, including market
and household responses, and with public action, including policies and programs
to deal with the problem? Quantitative analyses in the study are based on house-
hold-level data specifically collected for this research in western Sudan, available
data from other sources, and market- and sector-level information.
Periods of drought have occurred throughout the history of Sudan. In most
cases these have been followed by famine and outbreaks of disease. The 1984-85
famine was the outcome of a long process of drought and desertification, absent or
misplaced public food and agricultural policy, and insufficient public response.
Lacking in the government's response were a permanent institution responsible for
famine preparedness and the political will to intervene early to prevent large-scale
hunger and mass movements. Emergency food aid, which largely followed official
recognition of the existence of famine, was constrained by untimely availability
and logistical and managerial limitations. In addition, the macroeconomic policy
environment in the 1970s and 1980s was not conducive to preventing erosion of the
country's capacity to deal with the drought crises. War and civil unrest further
undermined such capacity.
A large drop in agricultural production occurred in 1984/85. This decline
translated into a large drop in farm employment. A strong link between agricultural
production and income (from crop production, local off-farm wage employment,
and livestock) increased the extent of income failure. As shown by an IFPRI survey
in the famine-prone area of Kordofan in western Sudan, a large drop in nominal
income, coupled with a rapid rise in food prices, resulted in a severe and wide-
spread decline in purchasing power. Farmers had to dispose of their animals to
maintain their food entitlement and to avoid imminent loss through death of the
animals. Asset-poor households had to depend greatly on nonagricultural products
and transfers to augment their low income. Some farmers had to move out from
their villages much earlier than the normal season in search of work or relief
support. Given the large share of income spent on food, households had to adjust
their food consumption by cutting the size and frequency of meals and by changing
the composition of their diet.
The original survey information from western Sudan shows that farmers adopt
multiple coping paths and responses that involve substitutions in production, in-
come, assets, and consumption. Households vary in their emphasis on the choice of
coping responses. In general, they try to avoid action that would endanger their
future survival. Their success in coping, however, is unequal across households
13because of unequal income and asset bases and unequal access to community
risk-sharing networks and public support. Famine strikes different socioeconomic
groups in different ways. The evidence of 1984-85 shows that although the famine
had a distinct location character, some groups were affected much more than
others. Hardest hit were camel nomads in the northern arid zones, especially
small-herd owners; asset-poor households, particularly recent settlers and capital-
constrained female-headed households; and families without working members.
The problem of recent settlers posed a special dilemma in light of the presence of
a large number of war refugees in the area. In general, the burden of coping fell
heavily on low-income households with a very small protective income source or
asset base. The evidence also shows a rapid shift in the phases of and participation
in the coping process that was adopted by the rural population in western Sudan, a
severely affected famine area.
The study traces the effects of drought on production, markets, consumption,
and nutrition, focusing on the 1984-85 famine, its origin and aftermaths. Related
findings are briefly reviewed below. Rainfall levels have declined in Sudan during
the past three decades: mean annual rainfall declined by 6.7 percent between
1960-69 and 1970-79 and by 17.7 percent between 1970-79 and 1980-86. Further-
more, year-to-year fluctuations in rainfall around a trend line seem to have in-
creased, especially in arid and semi-arid zones. For example, coefficients of vari-
ation increased, on average, from 16 percent in the 1960s to 21 percent in the 1970s
and 32 percent in the 1980s in western Sudan.
The decline in rainfall levels has resulted in low growth in cereal production,
largely because of short-run effects on yield, as evident from a comparison of
growth estimates with and without the drought year of 1984. Cereal production is
also marked by considerable and increasing year-to-year fluctuation. Yield vari-
ability has been strongly associated with variability of rainfed crops.
Drought-production relationships show that a 10 percent drop in annual rainfall
from mean levels implies a 5.0 percent drop in cereal production and a 3.7 percent
drop in yield at the country level. Sorghum yield and, consequently, production are
shown to be more affected than millet by declines in rainfall. A 10 percent drop in
annual rainfall results in drops of 7.3 and 3.0 percent in sorghum and millet
production, respectively.
Markets for cereals are thin and very responsive to production changes. De-
flated (real) cereal prices increased more than three times in the main famine year
of 1984-85 compared with 1982-83. The related time-series analysis in the study
shows that, under the prevailing trade and market-structure conditions, a 10 percent
drop in production led to an approximate 26 percent increase in real prices of
cereals in the same year. A 10 percent reduction in stocks (calculated at mean
values) increased prices by 8 percent. Trade and aid contributed little toward
mitigating the price effects of the drought-driven production fluctuation.
The terms-of-trade change in disfavor of livestock and cash crops signals one
element of the decline in the purchasing power of rural households. The terms of
trade between domestic cereal and livestock changed drastically as a consequence
of the drought in the 1980s. They increased from 1:1 in 1980 to about 1:8 or 1:10
in 1984-85. Thus, to acquire the same amount of cereals, 8 to 10 times more
livestock had to be offered in 1984-85 than in 1980. The model analysis shows that
a 10 percent drop in cereal production resulted in an 18 percent increase in the
14cereal and livestock terms of trade. Domestic terms of trade between cereals and
cash crops, such as groundnuts and sesame, increased by 2 to 3 times as a conse-
quence of the drought-related declines in cereal production. These combined pro-
duction and price effects resulted in food-entitlement failure for large segments of
the rural population.
Although considerable relative differences prevailed between regions, the gen-
eral food price movement during the food crisis in 1984-85 spread all over the
country, thereby spreading the burden of the crisis to the poor in nondrought and
urban areas. A statistical model testing for market integration shows that food
markets were not segmented and that there was strong transmission of prices.
Though interregional commodity flows were hampered by high market-transaction
costs, particularly transport costs, a situation of "market failure" during the food
crisis was not observed. However, the dramatic changes in the domestic terms of
trade could happen only because of the limited integration of the country into the
international exchange economy. A less constrained administrative and foreign
exchange situation, or more (timely) food aid, might have prevented some of the
large movements in prices.
The growth of aggregate per capita food availability was negative in the 1970s
and 1980s, largely because of low growth in production relative to population
growth. In 1984, there was a particularly large drop in per capita food availability
despite measures to mitigate consumption shortfalls, such as increased food aid,
imports, and off-take from public grain reserves. The drop varied by region and the
impact by type of household. Adjustment pressures to drought-induced price and
income changes are much greater for the low-income households, particularly for
those in drought-prone areas. This applies also to child nutritional welfare in these
households.
The combined production and price effects translated into nutritional deteriora-
tion. Deficiencies in rural health services also played a key role in this context. As
the recurrent drought had stripped many rural households of their asset base in the
early 1980s, the main drought in 1984 immediately translated into a drastic nutri-
tion problem. Many families were left with no ability to cope. Thus the observed
parallel movement of prices and malnutrition on a month-by-month basis suggests
that price information can be of only limited value as an indicator of "early"
warning when the asset base is already deteriorated. It also calls attention to the
need to prevent extreme price instability in the interest of child nutritional welfare.
Assessment of child nutritional status in the postfamine period of 1986-87,
based on a large sample survey, shows a sizable presence of child undernutrition,
with significant variations across regions, locations, and seasons. Child charac-
teristics (such as sex and age), frequency and type of food intake, human capital
endowment (that is, mother's education), health and sanitation environment, and
incidence of disease are found to be important determinants of child malnutrition
status. In addition, it is confirmed that cereal price increases not only significantly
reduce household staple food consumption but also contribute to children's nutri-
tional deterioration (weight-for-age). The combination of lack of food at the house-
hold level and acute diarrhea in children results in life-threatening nutritional
deterioration of large proportions of preschool children. This analysis, stressing
policy action for nutritional improvement, requires that food availability, employ-
ment, and community health and sanitation be addressed simultaneously.
15The 1984-85 crisis uprooted large segments of the rural population and resulted
in depletion of their assets and in stress migration into urban areas. Future food
price explosions (in the context of another drought) will hit these people even more
as wage earners without degrees of freedom to cope.
The evidence of the 1984-85 famine confirms that drought is a major determin-
ing factor in famine in Sudan. Decline in the level of rainfall and its increased
variability substantially undercut the food entitlement of large segments of the
population through production and employment effects. The risk increased during
the 1980s because of continued low and variable production, slow recovery in the
asset base, permanent out-migration, and increased dependency on volatile rural
markets. In fact, the new dynamics of famine make it much more difficult to
identify and trace vulnerable groups on a continuous basis for policy targeting.
The microhousehold and community-level effects of specific projects and
programs aimed at reducing famine are reviewed on the basis of original survey
information. This includes an assessment of food aid and relief management in
Kordofan, asset-rebuilding programs (including both food for tree-planting and
livestock restocking), and agricultural-technology dissemination (in Darfur). In
conclusion, from these project experiences, the critical role of sustainable food
production in the rainfed sector of Sudan is emphasized. The key components of
such a strategy include improvement of resource conservation and management,
development and dissemination of labor-augmenting technology, and promotion of
human and physical infrastructure as well as institutional capacity. Relief and
rehabilitation are necessary integrants of the whole development process.
Based on a review of past policies and problems, the study emphasizes a set of
general policy priorities for famine prevention that includes political stability, that
is, an end to wars; participation of the rural population, especially through decen-
tralization, in relief and rehabilitation; macroeconomic policy reforms, especially
of exchange rate and pricing policies, and the control of inflation.
The specific policy priorities for famine prevention derived from the quantita-
tive analysis include (1) promotion of sustainable growth in the traditional rainfed
agriculture through expansion of rural infrastructure; provision of labor-intensive
public works programs; input supply, with scope for private-sector involvement;
adaptive research, technology, and extension; and protection of the environment;
and (2) emergency preparedness and relief with buffer stocks for price stabiliza-
tion, improved relief management and early warning systems, strengthening of
rural health and sanitation, and comprehensive legislation for famine prevention.
16FAMINE DEBATE, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK,
AND STUDY APPROACH
The Research Questions
Sudan has been hit hard by the droughts in the 1970s and 1980s. Loss of the
resource base of households, especially in the west and northeast, has led to serious
economic deprivation. The 1984-85 famine is a recent case in point. This study
acknowledges the important and disturbing role of the long-lasting armed conflict
in southern Sudan in undermining the economic and institutional base of the
country and thereby increasing overall famine vulnerability. The regional focus of
the study is, however, on the western and northern provinces of the country.
Understanding these problems requires a properly conceived framework to
examine the factors contributing to the process of recurring severe food shortages
and entitlement failures. A brief overview of the ongoing debate on the causes of
the 1984-85 famine is juxtaposed here with a conceptual framework. Past policy
failures have created the environment that now makes drought a central cause of
famine crises and persistent hunger in large parts of Sudan. This point will be
discussed in Chapter 7 within an overview of the "disenabling" economic policy
environment in Sudan during the past three decades.
While focusing on drought, the study begins with the hypothesis that famine in
Sudan is the result of interactions of various determinants. Drought is one of these,
but to stimulate an appropriate policy response that will reduce the famine vulner-
ability of the people, it must be understood in a broad context. The research
questions of this study are, What are the determinants of famine in Sudan? What
role does drought play? Who is affected? And what has been the experience with
private coping responses, including market and household reactions, and with
public action, including policies and programs for dealing with the famine problem?
The Debate on Causes of the 1984-85 Famine
Studies on the 1984-85 famine in Sudan converge on two key facets. First,
famine is an outcome of a long process. The main contributing components are
drought and desertification (Ibrahim 1984; Ibrahim 1985; ILO 1985; IES 1986),
lack of or misguided government food and agricultural policies (Abdel Ati 1988),
and absence of institutional capacity and political will to respond effectively to
famine and economic crises (Shepherd 1988). Second, the outcome of such a
process is often articulated in declining regional (but not necessarily national) food
availability, which, because of extreme infrastructural deficiencies, results in mass
starvation and excess deaths due to hunger and diseases.
17A large-scale decline in food availability is considered central to an explana-
tion of widespread food shortages and starvation in Sudan, but not in general as a
cause of famine (Dreze and Sen 1990). By 1981/82 the cereal food balance in
Darfur had dropped by 23 percent from its 1971/72 level, and in 1983 there was a
deficit of 76 percent of the sorghum requirements in Kordofan (ILO 1985). El-Sam-
mani points out that in 1984 the food gap was 80 percent of the total cereal
requirement in Kordofan (IES 1986). In the case of pastoralists, who depend
mainly on livestock, the effects of famine were often transmitted through loss of
livestock and deterioration of terms of trade (ILO 1985).
Desertification (loss of productive land) is itself an outcome of natural and
human actions. The desertification process has intensified since the beginning of
the dry cycle of 1968 because of a declining pattern of precipitation, a southward
shift of the rainfall belt, increased variability of rainfall, and enhanced human
activities such as overcultivation, overgrazing, woodcutting, and deforestation.
The process was exacerbated in the early 1980s by the occurrence of consecutive
droughts that caused the deterioration of rangelands and a large drop in land
productivity. The great famine of 1984-85, according to those who ascribe famine
to ecological imbalance, was the outcome of a long process of desertification
intensified by years of droughts.
The famine of 1984-85 has also been ascribed to faulty agricultural policy.
Central to this argument is that the pursuit of "modernization" of the agricultural
sector, which often meant the promotion of large-scale, capital-intensive technol-
ogy in high-potential areas, has contributed to the neglect of the smallholder
traditional crop and livestock sectors and a deterioration of the ecological balance.
The neglect of traditional smallholders, which is marked by low levels of their food
production and income base, means a low level of preparedness on the part of the
farm population to survive consecutive seasons of crop failures. In the case of the
1984-85 famine, because of low and variable income, farmers were ill-prepared in
terms of generating or accessing their staple foods, especially in the western
regions of Darfur and Kordofan and in Eastern Region.
The government's ineffective response to protecting these rural populations in
1984-85 was also considered a contributing factor to the resulting large-scale
starvation and deaths (Shepherd 1988). Lack of a permanent institution responsible
for famine preparedness and response, absence of a famine policy, failure to invoke
the famine codes of 1920, slow official recognition of the risky situation, and late
intervention were characteristics of the situation in 1984-85. There were limited
and ad hoc responses, but they were not sufficient to avert or minimize the crisis.
The writings on Sudan point out that even though the famine of 1984-85 was
nationwide, it was more concentrated in the arid and semi-arid areas of the western
and eastern regions. These areas are characterized by ongoing desertification
intensified by consecutive droughts, highly variable seasonal food production, an
undeveloped infrastructure base, and neglect on the part of the government in
enhancing and shielding the income capacity of the population. In addition, these
regions have been identified as the areas of highest population increase (after
Khartoum and Upper Nile) in the 1973-83 period (ILO 1985).
The causes of famine suggested by these writers largely fit into the profile of
African countries that fail to enhance and protect the income-generating capacity
of their most vulnerable population in times of crisis (Dreze 1989). The search for
18an in-depth understanding of these causes is the primary component of the present
study. This pursuit is undertaken in a framework that makes the entitlement ap-
proach (Sen 1981) central to understanding the causes of and ability to cope with
crises. However, great importance is also attached to the food production and
supply dimensions as key variables in explaining the relationships between the
production-employment-income-consumption components in the African context
(Mellor and Gavian 1987), particularly in Sudan. As will be shown, food produc-
tion and food entitlement failures are very closely linked in Sudan. It will be argued
that strengthening food entitlements has to be brought about to a large extent—but
not only—by expanding agricultural growth in the Sudan through employment
generation and increased food supply.
Conceptual Framework
A clear distinction needs to be made between hunger (including seasonal
hunger), undernutrition, and famine.
Hunger—largely an advocacy rather than a scientific term—is defined here as
not having enough to eat to lead a healthy and active life. It is a recurring feature
of the absolute poor, especially in developing countries. In connection with the
above, seasonal hunger is often associated with the population in rural areas, where
it occurs during the preharvest season when food stocks of the rural poor are
depleted and the affected population can ill afford to purchase food because of
related higher seasonal prices.
Undernutrition is due to a deficient intake of specific nutrients in a diet. It can
lead to illness (lack of energy, retardation, or blindness, for instance) or even death,
although the symptoms may not be recognized as indications of nutrient deficien-
cies. Interactions between undernutrition and illness are particularly complex.
Famine is the presence in a specific area or country of widespread and extreme
hunger that results in drastic loss of body weight and a rising death rate. The causes
may be shortages in food availability or inaccessibility of available food due to
drought, flood, political (war) or economic disruptions, or massive income declines
brought about by factor or product market disruptions. Most frequently, famines
are a result of complex combinations of some of these causes. Famines are mainly
a rural feature and occur in areas where chronic undernutrition is often observed.
A root cause of famine is poverty, including the associated vulnerability to
disaster. Yet poverty may be seen as an endogenous outcome of resources and
policies. Figure 1 is an attempt to delineate relationships between root causes and
symptoms of famine events in a rough sketch. Endogenous and exogenous relation-
ships are conceptualized at different levels of analysis. The broad interactions
between policy failures; resource poverty, "bad luck," and disaster; and the popu-
lation transition process are depicted. Cause-and-effect relationships are then dis-
tinguished with some of the more important nonexhaustive indications of feedback
mechanisms between the four levels of analysis: (1) the top layer comprises the
level of economic strategy and policy interacting with discrimination, social con-
flicts, and wars; resource endowments of the country and their relationship to
climate or disaster events influencing levels of poverty and instability of the (food)
















20the interactions between these three basic clusters in constituting famine events—
for instance, the political economy of hunger and endogenous population growth;
(2) the second layer contains policy interventions (such as subsidies, distributional
policies, and the investment portfolio) that influence the input/output relationships
(production levels and stability); (3) policy interventions interact with the price
formation and interlinkages in capital, labor, and output markets depicted in the
third layer; and (4) the last layer of assessment of famine consequences relates to
the actual observation of income and consumption failures and the resulting starva-
tion and excess mortality interacting with the collapse of services and stress
migration.
Famine outcomes are an indication of a failure of the coping process that is
observed at household and individual levels. Figure 2 provides a simplified anat-
omy of a household economy linked to outcomes determined at layers (1), (2), and
(3) in Figure 1. In addition, it shows a pattern of responses at the household level
and sources of variation in household capacity to respond to crisis.
Figure 2 represents a typical case of a sedentary farm household. A great
proportion of its resources, land and labor in particular, goes into crop production.
In addition, part of the family labor is switched to generate income from other
sources to supplement crop income. Household income at any particular point in
time is a combined outcome of these income sources. Exogenous changes in
climate, market prices, and public policies (outcomes in Figure 1) influence the
level as well as the sources of household income. Income generated from these
sources is translated into consumption and asset accumulation. Food consumption
is presumed to affect household nutritional status, which in turn influences the
incidence of morbidity and mortality in interaction with the sanitary and health
environment. Part of the income that is saved is often invested in livestock to
ensure continuity as well as protection of future income flow.
Various paths of adjustments open to the household are displayed in Figure 2:
production, labor (migration), asset, transfer (individual, community, or public),
and consumption paths. A large drop in crop production is likely to subject a
household to severe stress because of strong production-income-consumption
links. However, a production shortfall should not necessarily be translated into
much-reduced food intake if other paths of adjustment prevent income and con-
sumption failures. Of course, the relative importance of these paths shifts, depending
on the source, persistence, and phase of the process that has triggered the food distress.
The simple structure in Figure 2 does not capture variations in a household's
demographic life cycle and entitlement endowment (level of skill and experience,
access to resources, accumulation of assets, and access to steady outside-income
sources). These differences contribute variation in the choice of responses and
success of coping. Households with low income, particularly those that are mainly
exposed to high-risk income and have few income and asset sources, are at high
risk. The burden of coping falls on these households unless community or public
support reinforces their coping devices.
Overview of the Study Approach
The middle path in Figure 1 especially traces the drought-famine link pursued
in this report. In Figure 3, this key path is isolated, and the types of interventions
21Figure 2—Paths of household response to declining food entitlement
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22Figure 3—Overview of the focus of the analysis
Policies—Issues of Targeting


















that could be targeted at the various points of the drought-famine chain are identi-
fied. The principal relationships may be thought of as a set of recursive systems of
equations defined as
where
Q = Q (W, P, Zp U,) production response,
P
 = P (Q» Z2, U2) short-term price response, and
C = C (P, Y(Q), Z3, U3) consumption response,
Q = production index,
P = price index,




23W = weather index,
Y = income index,
Zt = nonweather and nonprice shifters,
Z2 = nonproduction-related shifters,
Z3 = nonprice and nonincome shifters, and
Up U2, U3 = error terms associated with production,
price, and consumption equations.
It is obvious that complex trade-offs prevail between the indicated types of
interventions in the short run and long run.
The presentation of the report follows the structure depicted in Figure 3. An
overview of the record of drought and famine in Sudan's history is introduced in
Chapter 3. It focuses especially on household and village experiences, based on
IFPRI surveys and other primary data. The experience of the 1984-85 famine is
highlighted with a discussion of its nature and effects and of the responses in the
drought region of western Sudan. This is followed by a review of the development
of agricultural production and a model relating rainfall to production at different
levels of commodity and regional disaggregation. The impact of the 1984 drought
is isolated to demonstrate the production effects of drought (Chapter 4). The
behavior of prices and markets in a context of production shortfalls and famine in
an environment of extremely weak interregional trade infrastructure is the focus of
Chapter 5. The transitory food security problem (famine) grows rapidly out of the
massive chronic food security and undernutrition problems. The effects of changes
in prices and income on nutrient consumption are traced in Chapter 6. An assess-
ment of the nutritional situation in the postfamine period shows the prevalence of
undernutrition in the presence of inadequate food intake, poor community and
health infrastructure, and low levels of human capital. Chapter 7 reviews past
economic and famine policies—or the lack thereof—and draws lessons from the
experience gained in coping with food crises in the 1980s through food aid and
specific projects, again drawing mainly on original household-level survey infor-
mation. Finally, conclusions are drawn regarding policy options that would be
effective in coping with the adverse effects of drought, on both short- and long-
term bases, to prevent drought from being a trigger for famine.
24RECORD OF DROUGHT AND HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL
CONSEQUENCES IN WESTERN SUDAN
The Historical Record
Drought and its consequences are historical as well as contemporary problems
in Sudan. A careful review of the literature by Ibrahim (1985) shows that periods
of drought have occurred throughout the history of Sudan, and in most cases these
have been followed by famines and outbreaks of disease.
1
An overview of droughts and related famines in the country is provided in
Table 1. The earliest recorded famine occurred in 1684. The 1835-38 period is
known as the "years of famine," particularly the year 1836, which is notable for
widespread cholera that decimated a population already weakened by hunger (Hill
1970). The 1888-89 famine is considered to be the greatest famine, caused by two
consecutive years of poor rains (Slatin Pasha 1896; Churchill 1899; Duncan 1952;
Farwell 1967; Holt 1970) and by political instability and unrest. Hundreds of
thousands of people died of hunger and disease. Rain was abundant the following
year, but harvests were destroyed by locusts and other pests. The year 1913 also
witnessed poor rains, but major famine was averted by importing corn and distrib-
uting it free (MacMichael 1934).
These records indicate diversity in the spatial incidence of drought and famine,
with frequent occurrences concentrated in the western and eastern regions (Figure
4). A paucity of information and unbalanced documentation of historical events
may be responsible for showing less frequency of drought in the western part of the
country. In 1983, aware of these facts, Ibrahim (1985) investigated the drought
experience of western Sudan. He relied on the memories of farmers, meteorological
records, and fragmentary historical records to identify years of drought and famine.
Farmers identified 36 years as years of drought and famine in the period between
1912 and 1974—26 years in eastern Kordofan and 18 years in eastern Darfur. Eight
of these years were common to both areas. Seventeen of these years were given
local names to describe sources of survival, scarcity of necessities, and magnitude
of hardships. Fifty percent of these perceived periods of drought were meteorologi-
cally confirmed, with rainfall well below average. Records of rainfall failed to
recognize the other years, perhaps, according to Ibrahim, because of the nature of
rainfall in the semi-arid areas where rain is highly localized or because the recall of
events by local inhabitants may be faulty.
Ibrahim's findings concur with historical records that 1913, 1914, and 1927
were drought years (Table 1), but these droughts actually spread from the eastern
'This chapter draws heavily on contributions of Mohamed Babiker Ibrahim (1985, 1990).
















"The great famine" (Urn Lahm)
"Years of famine"
Cholera spread through country
Slight famine
Hundreds of thousands died
No rain for a year, crops failed and grain
became increasingly scarce. Prices rose
to US$40 and then to US$60 for two sacks
of dura (sorghum). People sold their chil-
dren as slaves to save their lives and later
bought them back with higher prices.
Thousands died of hunger and disease
Locusts and mice consumed the products
Poor rain, corn brought from India and
issued free of charge in distressed areas
and cheaply elsewhere
"The year of the flour" (flour brought








































Source: Based on data from Mohamed Babiker Ibrahim, "Adjustment to Drought Hazard in the Semi-Arid
Areas of the Sudan" (Ph.D. diss., University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, 1985).
border of Sudan westward to Kordofan and Darfur regions. Moreover, Ibrahim
added 1935,1937,1942,1949,1951, and 1957 as years of severe drought in Sudan.
Shepherd (1988) identified 1932,1938, and 1949 as years of severe famine through
investigation of famine files for the period between 1932 and 1950. Combining
these two sources, one would speculate that 1913-14, 1927, 1932-34, 1937-38,
1942, and 1949 were the years of most severe localized or nationwide famine in the
country in this century up to the end of the 1950s. Occurrences of severe famine
were fewer in the 1960s and 1970s, except for 1966, when famine was reported by
farmers in the west. Of course, there could have been numerous unnoticed localized
famines. Sudan largely escaped the worst years of the Sahelian drought of 1968-73
but experienced a major drought-related famine in 1984-85—about 100 years after
the major drought of 1888-89.
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27Ibrahim also pointed out that drought and hunger are generally closely related
in the western provinces, but the relationship is not a constant and necessary one.
Failure of rains had nothing to do with the remembered food shortages in 1929,
1945, 1950, and 1959, which consistently show up in household-level surveys but
do not coincide with actual rainfall information from the very same locations.
Ibrahim suspects that it is probable that these food-shortage situations were due to
insects, locusts, rodents, or plant diseases, or that local people were subjected to
some kind of grain scarcity for social, administrative, or political reasons.
The Experience of Drought in the 1980s
The severe drought of 1984 was the culmination of a prolonged period of low
rainfall that intensified after the end of the 1970s. According to Nicholson (1985),
rainfall deficits for 1981 through 1984 equal or exceed those of the early 1970s in
all Sahelo-Saharan, Sahel, and Sudan zones. Hulme (1984) also concluded, on the
basis of observed rainfall data in the arid zone of Sudan, that the years from 1979
to 1983 were as dry as 1969-73. Recent findings (Eldredge et al. 1987) on western
Sudan reveal that dry conditions have persisted in Northern Kordofan and Northern
Darfur provinces since 1966. The authors attribute the downward pattern in annual
precipitation to a decline in rainfall in July, August, and September—months that
account for not less than 90 percent of annual rainfall. Moreover, they ascribe the
decline in these months largely to fewer rainy days.
Information at the local level illustrates the development of dry conditions.
According to a 1983 field survey, farmers and nomads in eastern Kordofan pointed
out that the years between 1979 and 1983 were drought years (Ibrahim 1985).
Households that migrated from Northern Kordofan and settled around Omdurman
identified the period of 1980-84 as a severe dry period (Khalil 1987). The 1984
drought was the peak of the process that was set in motion in the late 1970s.
The main area affected by drought and desertification in Sudan is above 12°
north latitude (Figure 5). In August 1984 Kordofan and Darfur had 2.8 million and
1.4 million, respectively, classified as affected population (Table 2). Of this af-
fected population, those who lived above 13° north latitude were considered as
severely affected. This group comprised 1.2 million in Kordofan and 0.8 million in
Darfur. The reports of the United Nations Emergency Operation office for 1985
and early 1986 classified those at nutritional risk as vulnerable groups, especially
pregnant and lactating women, and children under five years of age (OXFAM-
UNICEF and Kordofan 1985a, 1985b, 1985c, 1986). These groups were estimated
at more than 700,000 in Kordofan and about 800,000 in Darfur by mid-1985
(Pearson 1986).
Data on the magnitude of the displaced population are patchy. Available
fragmentary information, however, indicates sizable displacements. By 1984, the
population that had settled in the four major camps around Omdurman was esti-
mated at 46,000 (Economic and Social Research Council 1988). Those camped on
the outskirts of El Obeid were estimated at 45,000 by March 1985. There were an
estimated 25,000 people living in the camps on the outskirts of Kosti by June 1985.
The agricultural households experienced large-scale erosion in their traditional
income base, with few employment opportunities outside the rural economy.
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Source: Based on data from Roger Pearson, "Lessons from Famine in Sudan (1984-86)" (United Nations
International Children's Emergency Fund, Khartoum, 1986, mimeo).
"Population that lived between 12° and 18° north latitudes.
bPopulation that lived above 13° north latitude.
cNo information available.
No definition of "affected" or "vulnerable" reported.
Population at nutritional risk.
Large-scale entitlement failure occurred despite continuous adjustments on the part
of the population to stabilize their production, income, and consumption. In ex-
treme cases, some segments of the population became destitute and moved out
from their villages en masse (de Waal 1987; KRMFEP 1986; Mohammed 1988).
The effects of the years of drought in the early 1980s also had far-reaching
consequences on the ecosystem of the region. The continuous aridity, which was
marked by a decline in the water table and low vegetation cover, intensified the
process of desertification. The process was further exacerbated by human re-
sponses to the changing environment as farmers continued expansion of cultivation
into marginal and fragile areas to make up declines in yields and resorted to
generating income from the sale of tree crops to support their falling income
(Ibrahim 1985).
The Case of Western Sudan
The western part of Sudan lies approximately between 08° 40' and 20° north
latitudes and between 22° and 32° 25' east longitudes. The area north of 16° north
latitude represents desert. The area between 14° and 16° north latitudes is semi-
desert. South of the semidesert, between 12° and 14° north latitudes, lies the
Sahelian zone. The Sahel includes most of the region's agricultural population,
who depend for their income on livestock and crop production. The Sudanic zone
lies south of 12° north latitude.
The amount of rainfall decreases northward until it reaches the desert zone.
Average annual rainfall is less than 100 millimeters in the desert. Mean rainfall
ranges from 100 to 200 millimeters per year in the semidesert. North of the Sahel,
30where it is arid for 9-10 months, mean rainfall ranges from 200 to 400 millimeters
a year. Annual precipitation ranges from 400 to 600 millimeters on average along
the southern frontier of the Sahel. The latitudinal pattern of rainfall is modified by
the existence of the Jebel Marra Highlands in Darfur.
The soils are sandy in the semidesert. They are more stabilized in the northern
part of the Sahel—the goz belt. The soils become sandy loam in the middle and
clay in the south. The alluvial wadi soils range from small pockets in the north to
larger areas southward. The area around Jebel Marra is intersected by numerous
seasonal streams and relatively rich wadi soils. These seasonal streams are used for
cultivation and water harvesting, especially during drought years.
The northern parts of Darfur and Kordofan represent areas typical of arid and
semi-arid zones. Population is sparse but relatively dense in areas with easy access
to better soils and water points. Agricultural production potentials are continuously
depleted due to ongoing desertification, which has been exacerbated by recurrent
droughts (Ibrahim 1984). The poor resource base and low technology utilization
contribute to low productivity. Undeveloped infrastructure, particularly transport
systems, limits opportunities for integration into the larger but weak market econ-
omy (Swift and Grey 1989; Darfur Regional Government 1988).
Effects of Droughts in the 1980s
Western Sudan, particularly the northern part, experienced extremely low
rainfall in the years between 1982 and 1984, with a record low in 1984 (see, for
example, Figure 6). The effects of these drought years precipitated a large drop in
agricultural production and income. Dramatic deterioration in economic conditions
resulted in a severe and widespread decline in purchasing power, collapse in the
asset base, large and unseasonal migration, and deterioration of nutritional status in
1984-85. Failure to generate or gain access to food, coupled with poor access to
health facilities, contributed to increased morbidity and mortality rates in 1985.
Crop Production. Between 1982 and 1984, production of major crops (millet,
sorghum, sesame, and groundnuts) declined sharply. The regional data for North-
ern Kordofan show a record low production in the 1984 crop year. Production of
millet and sesame (the two most important crops in Northern Kordofan) reached
lows of 14 and 10 percent, respectively, in 1984 relative to the 1974-81 level (Table
3). The drop in production was largely associated with the continuous decline in
yield. Village-based studies in Northern Kordofan indicate the occurrence of se-
vere crop failure in the drier northern areas. Ibrahim (1985) noted that crop yields
were severely affected in the northern semidesert zone. Mohammed (1988) noted
that there was a total crop failure in 20 villages in eastern Kordofan in 1984/85. An
IFPRI survey in Kordofan villages shows sizable crop failure, even in the middle
Sahelian zone (Table 4).
2
2The IFPRI survey covered 240 sedentary households in 10 villages of Bara and El Obeid districts in
1989. Villages were sampled to reflect variations in the 1984-85 drought-related famine experience,
their degree of involvement in rehabilitation projects, and access to water sources and main towns. A
sample of households was drawn from the project-based stratified frame of participants and eligible
nonparticipant households.
31Figure 6—Rainfall at selected sites in western Sudan, 1917-85
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Sources: Sudan, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics (Khar-
toum: MANR, 1970, 1984, 1987); and Sudan, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
Current Agricultural Statistics: 1984/85 and 1985/86 (Khartoum: MANR, 1988).


















































































Source: International Food Policy Research Institute survey, 1989.
Note: Figures in parentheses are coefficients of variation.
33Farmers in Northern Darfur also experienced years of consecutive crop failures
in the 1980s (Ibrahim 1990). Occurrence of crop failures was noted in some parts
of Northern Darfur in 1982 and 1983; for example, Um Kaddada Area Council in
the east. However, the crop failure of 1984 was severe and extensive. Production
of millet, the main staple food for the inhabitants of Northern Darfur, reached a low
of 14 percent in comparison with the 1981 level. The average yield reached 18
percent of the normal level in the same year. Despite improvement in total rainfall
in 1985, some areas of Northern Darfur continued to experience crop failure.
Stock of Animals. Poor grazing and health conditions, which worsened in 1984,
resulted in large livestock losses. The 1984-85 period witnessed a sharp decline in
growth rates of herds due to high mortality rates, distress sales, and low birth rates.
Estimates of livestock losses in IFPRI survey villages indicate that herd size, which
averaged about 2.0 livestock units per capita by the end of 1983, dropped to 0.26
units by the end of 1985—a drop of 86 percent (Table 5). The largest drop occurred
in the case of cattle. By the end of 1985, the share of cattle in herd composition was
2.2 percent. Goats, on the other hand, gained a more prominent position—as much
as 52 percent, compared with 35 percent at the end of 1983.
Mortality rates were relatively high for the less drought-resistant animals—
cattle and sheep (Table 6). Cattle and sheep require relatively shorter drinking
intervals (3-5 days)—much shorter than camels, which are served in intervals of
9-15 days. Sheep are also selective in their grazing behavior, both in type of feed
and timing of feeding. Cattle and sheep were highly vulnerable to poor pasture and
water conditions and a worsening disease environment. The young and the preg-
nant or lactating females were the most vulnerable in all species, causing great
damage to future restocking capacity. According to the 1986 official survey in
northern and eastern Kordofan, the losses were much greater in the northern arid
zones, where shortage of pasture and water was intense (KRMFEP 1986).
Table 5—Herd size and distribution among rural households in Kordofan,
1983-88
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Source: International Food Policy Research Institute survey, 1989.
aIn livestock units, cattle = 0.83, goats/sheep = 0.20, camels = 1.0, and donkeys • 0.50.













































































































































Source: International Food Policy Research Institute survey, 1989.
Note: n.a. means not available.
aNet off-take equals sales minus purchases.
Other losses include slaughtering, gifts, thefts, and unspecified disappearances.
Birth rates were too low in these years to offset the high losses. Production
response indicators in Table 7 show that calving intervals and suckling periods are
longer and growth is slower in drought years. Poor physical condition due to
starvation and disease, and the need to suckle offspring for a longer period contrib-
ute to a shorter calving interval. This is evident from much-reduced birth rates in
the 1983-85 period. And the animals that were born were slow to reach maturity.
The natural process was thus self-regulated to maintain pace with the surrounding
environment.
A similar pattern was evident in Darfur. Animal losses were much higher in the
north than in the south. For example, 71 percent of the cattle and 40 percent of the
goats in the north were lost. The south lost 37 percent of the cattle and 10 percent
of the goats. The camel-herding nomads of the north suffered the most. Ibrahim
(1990) noted losses of as much as 70-90 percent of camels among the camel
herders, particularly the Medub tribe. The sedentary farmers also witnessed a sharp
drop in their livestock. Among sedentary farmers interviewed in Northern Darfur,
44 percent reported loss of all their sheep and 14 percent reported total loss of goats
(Ibrahim 1990). Less than 10 percent of the sample managed to maintain their herds
throughout the drought years.
35Table 7—Variation in animal production response between normal and
















































Source: Sudan, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Pilot Survey of Livestock Production and
Marketing in Southern Darfur: With Emphasis on 1983-85 Drought Effects (Khartoum: MANR, 1987).
The effects of large losses are evident in the ownership of livestock in the
postdrought years. In 1985, livestock assets in 10IFPRI survey villages in El Obeid
and Bara districts of Northern Kordofan reached 14 percent of their 1983 level. By
1988, they had recovered only to 19 percent of the 1983 level. The gradual buildup
has shown an increased concentration on low-cost and drought-enduring animals.
Distress Migration. The nomads have adjusted their seasonal movements over
the years in response to periodic drought conditions. In normal years, the camel-
herding nomads of the north move their herds northward at the onset of the wet
season. At the end of the wet season, they move the herds southward toward the
southern fringe of the semidesert belt (around 14° north latitude) or to the Sahelian
belt (12° north latitude to 14° north latitude) and settle around water points during
the dry season. The cattle owners of the south move northward at the onset of the
rain as far as 13° north latitude and stay below 10° north latitude during the dry
season.
A baseline survey in Sodari district in Northern Kordofan reveals that the
northern pastoralists have increasingly shifted their southward movement (darat
grazing) to October instead of beginning it as late as January (el-Sammani et al.
1984). Ibrahim (1985) also noted from a sample of nomads that since 1979, 43
percent had changed the areas where they spent the dry months. In recent years the
northern nomads of Kordofan have intensified their penetration deep into the south
below 12° north latitude. By 1983, for example, the Kababish tribe of the north was
found deep in the southern reaches of Kordofan (el-Sammani et al. 1984).
Distress migration was also observed among the northern nomads in Darfur in
the 1983-85 period (Figure 7). Most of the Medub tribe lost their camels and moved
to eastern Darfur to work as agricultural laborers or to a relief camp in Mellit town.
The Zaghawa tribe started to migrate from their tribal land at the end of 1983 and
settled south of El Fasher with their relatives who had moved earlier, during the
droughts of the 1970s. They also migrated to areas in Southern Darfur (Buram and
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Source: Based on data from Mohammed Babiker Ibrahim, "Adjustment to Drought Hazard in the Semi-
Arid Areas of the Sudan" (Ph.D. diss., University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, 1985).
El Daein) and outside the region to Omdurman and the irrigated scheme in Gezira
Province. The Zayadia nomads also moved from Mellit to Southern Darfur and the El
Daein area.
High rates of migration were also recorded in the Kordofan sedentary sample
(Table 8). In one village, as many as 95 percent of the IFPRI sample families had
at least one migrant member, the rate of migration per family reached a high of 89
percent, and whole-family migration reached 74 percent. Large-scale movements
involving whole families were also evident in other parts of the region. A study
among sedentary farmers in eastern Kordofan revealed that, from a low of 14.7
percent in 1980/81, the percentage of households that migrated with whole families
reached 45.9 percent in the peak drought year of 1984/85 (Mohammed 1988).
There are some notable developments in the postfamine period. First, the
whole-family migration rate dropped considerably in the years following the 1984-
85 period. Second, high proportions of rural families continue to migrate in com-
parison with their migration in prefamine years. However, the migration rate per
family has come back down to the level of the prefamine period. Third, migration
continues to be seasonal and of short duration, except for international migrants,
who are often young men with a better financial base.
Employment and Income. The decline in production that occurred in 1984
translated into a large drop in farm employment. Despite an expansion of area
planted, especially millet fields, farm employment dropped after planting by an
average of 70-75 percent from a normal (four-year moving average) level (Table 9).













































































Source: International Food Policy Research Institute survey, 1989.
















































































Sources: International Food Policy Research Institute survey, 1989; and Abdel Latif Ijami and Ronald D.
Krenz, Crop Production, Costs and Returns to Family Land in the Traditional Rainfed Areas of
Sudan: A Five-Year Summary, 1984/85-1988/89 (Khartoum: Ministry of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 1990).
38Typically, 17 percent of millet labor and 22 percent of sesame labor in Northern
Kordofan comes from nonfamily labor in a normal year. Landless as well as
capital-constrained landowning families often work in the villages for wages.
Abandonment of farm work in 1984, therefore, hit these groups hard. A study that
traced the rate of off-farm agricultural employment of sample participants in
eastern Kordofan also supports a substantial decline in employment opportunity
(Mohammed 1988). The percentage of families who worked as local agricultural
laborers dropped from 18 percent in 1983/84 to 3.1 percent in 1984/85.
The large drop in employment occurred at the same time there was a glut of
people seeking work. The decline in agricultural income as well as asset position
precipitated a large drop in farmers' reservation wages, which translated into high
entry into the labor market. Increased participation of women in the labor force was
particularly notable. The women from IFPRI survey villages, for example, engaged
in housekeeping employment in urban areas—a type of work not customary in
Sudanese culture. Wage rates consequently fell in rural labor markets. In the survey
area, for example, a day of labor could buy only 2 kilograms of millet in 1984,
compared with 6 kilograms in 1983.
There was a nearly complete collapse in crop income, which normally accounts
for one-third of household income. Moreover, since nearly half of household
income is from rainfall-dependent agricultural income sources (crop production,
local farm wage employment, and livestock), the extent of income failure was
much greater. When farmers faced a severe decline in their agricultural income,
they resorted to sale of assets, collected products, and nonagricultural income. A
sizable fraction of the sample derived their income primarily from liquidation of
assets and nonagricultural income sources (handicrafts and wage labor). Loans and
transfer receipts also enhanced income. Those in a better wealth position engaged
in large-scale selling of their assets (livestock and other household valuables). The
asset-poor had to depend greatly on handicrafts and transfers to augment their low
income from sale of assets.
Demographic Effect. By and large, the 1984-85 famine contributed to slow
growth in the population of the survey villages. The natural growth rate dropped
from an annual rate of 2.7 percent in 1983/84 to 2.3 percent in 1984/85. However,
a high rate of out-migration, especially in the short run, caused a large drop in
village population. A most notable case was in Bara district villages, such as Um
Sot, where the resident population dropped appreciably because of large-scale
emigration.
No significant excess mortality rate was evident in the survey villages in
1985—the year when demographic change could be presumed to show a sizable
shift. The crude mortality rate increased, but not as progressively as expected in a
period of low food intake and high incidence of disease. Thus, the expected
increase in the spread between high mortality and low fertility was not evident in
the survey villages. This fails to concur with de Waal's (1987) findings for Darfur,
the region further to the west of Kordofan, of a decline in the natural growth of
village population due to an excess mortality rate coupled with a decline in
birthrate.
These results are, of course, specific to study areas. Various pieces of evidence
point out that significant demographic change has occurred in the much drier areas
of Northern Kordofan. Estimates of famine-related deaths are tentative. There is
39strong evidence of a permanent out-migration to the central zone of Kordofan, and
to the Central and Eastern regions of Sudan (Khalil 1987; Ibrahim 1985, 1990).
High net permanent out-migration must have been a strong factor in depopulation
of these hard-hit areas.
Household-Level Coping Strategies
There is emerging evidence that provides insights into household coping be-
havior in periods of food crisis (see, for example, Jodha 1978; Corbett 1988; von
Braun and Teklu 1989; Campbell 1990). Corbett, for instance, synthesizes existing
knowledge of strategies and responses common in African settings. Von Braun and
Teklu reexamined these responses in the context of three African countries
(Rwanda, The Gambia, and Sudan) in order to understand interhousehold vari-
ations in success of coping with crises and with regular and predictable situations.
Studies on Sudan (de Waal and el-Amin 1986; de Waal 1987; Osborne et al.
1986) point out some common coping features: increased rate of migration, includ-
ing whole families; shift in income sources toward sale of livestock, personal
possessions, and transfers; reduction in frequency and size of meals; greater con-
sumption of tree fruits; and greater dependence on markets for acquisition of food
and sale of labor. Intrahousehold food-sharing and transfers are more common
among relatives.
The findings of this study are not conclusive as to the specific ordering of these
responses (Table 10), but there are notable patterns. Household responses involve
substitutions between and within consumption-income and asset paths. There are
discrete shifts in these paths (strategies), but responses are simultaneous across the
paths. Households vary in their emphasis on choices among these strategies and
responses. In general, they prefer to avoid action that would endanger their future
survival. However, coping success is unequal across households because of an
unequal endowment base, unequal access to a community risk-sharing network,
and unequal public support.
Production Response. Farmers in general prefer to maintain diversified crop
portfolios. Typically, a few crops dominate, and these are often a mix of staple and
cash crops (Table 11). This was the case in the Kordofan sample despite higher
relative factor returns of sesame to millet (on the order of 1.4 to 1) in the 1987 and
1988 seasons. Other considerations also enter into the choice of crop mix. Where
market transaction costs are prohibitive, as in the case of western Sudan, farmers
prefer to maintain food crops in their crop portfolios. Diversity in crop mix also
allows farmers to follow a flexible production schedule in terms of their responses
to varying rainfall patterns. Typically, farmers in the west shift from millet to other
crops (for example, sesame and watermelon) when early rains appear to be inade-
quate or when rains are concentrated in the latter part of the wet season (late July
and August).
In addition to the crop-diversification response, farmers adopt a variety of
loss-avoidance or loss-minimization measures. They shift their planting date to
before the onset of the first rains (remail) to get maximum moisture from a short
and intense rainfall. Because of high local variability of rains, it is common to plant
each crop in several different locations of different fields. Crops are also planted in
larger areas, when land availability permits, to ensure that some area is harvested
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at the end. Adoption of quick-maturing seed varieties is also on the rise because of
the recurrence of droughts (Ibrahim 1985).
Migration Response. Movements of the sedentary agricultural population are
characterized in normal years by dry-season migration of working persons. Nor-
mally, the sedentary cultivators leave their farms at the end of the harvest period
(December or January) and return in April or May to prepare their own farms. In
short, migration is voluntary, seasonal, and involves adult members of a household.
The migration rate per household ranges from 13 to 20 percent in normal years.
However, large-scale movements began soon after the farmers realized that the
1984/85 crop year was a complete failure. According to a survey of displaced
households from western Sudan who settled around Omdurman, 74.9 percent came
in September and October (Table 12)—much earlier than the normal January to
May dry-season migration.
41Table 11—Crop diversification of farm households under drought in Kordofan,
1983-88
Share of
Farms Growing Share of Value
Crop Season the Crop" of Production
(percent)




















Source: International Food Policy Research Institute survey, 1989.
aOnly those who participated in the production process up to and including harvesting are considered as
participants.










Source: Based on data from S. S. Khalil, The Socioeconomic and Political Implications of the Environ-
mental Refugees in the Vicinity of Omdurman, Monograph 6 (Khartoum: University of Khartoum,
Institute of Environmental Studies, 1987).
42Migration in Northern Kordofan took different directions, but because of di-
minished farm-employment opportunities, the emphasis was toward nearby towns
and major cities. The study in eastern Kordofan shows that the percentage of
migrants who moved to urban areas (mainly Omdurman and Um Ruwaba) peaked
at 63.8 percent in 1984/85 from the preceding four-year average of 5.4 percent
(Table 13). A survey of displaced population from eastern Bara, eastern Sodari, and
Um Ruwaba districts showed that 40, 53, and 45 percent, respectively, of the
district's total population moved to nearby towns and Khartoum (Table 14).
Notable changes have also been observed in the migration pattern of the
sedentary population during recent droughts. In Darfur, large-scale migration was
directed to the better rainfall areas of the south, especially to the Jebel Marra
Highlands and surrounding alluvial plains. Others moved to the larger cities of
Northern and Southern Darfur—El Fasher, Nyala, and Zalengi. Those without
prior experience of migrating for seasonal work and resource base opted to move
either to areas where they had relatives or access to casual work or to famine-relief
camps.
These variations in migration responses indicate the important influence of
proximity to urban areas, ecological variation (for example, presence of vegetation
as a source of direct food and cash income), and distance to water points. Distress
migration was high in areas where the agricultural resource base was limited,
alternative income sources were absent, and critical survival food was not easily
affordable and accessible. Also, where the social support network was discrimina-
tory (as was the case for recent residents in some villages), the disadvantaged were
forced to migrate.
In addition, there were household-specific factors that contributed to out-mi-
gration. An attempt to capture these variables was made in the context of a
dichotomous logit decision model. The estimated (log) odd-ratio parameters and
associated mean-level evaluated probabilities provide additional insights on the
decision to migrate or not (Table 15).
Table 13—Percentage and destination of migrants from sedentary households























































Source: Based on data from Mohammed Abdel Oadir Mohammed, "The Impact of Emergency Food Aid on
Traditional Agricultural Production Systems—The Case of East Kordofan District" (M.S. thesis,
University of Khartoum, 1988).
43Table 14—Percentage of population migrated from East Bara, East Sodari,



















































































































































































Source: KRMFEP (Kordofan Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning), The Current Situation
of Livestock in North Kordofan—Part I (El Obeid, Kordofan: KRMFEP 1986).
• The odds are higher for migration of families headed by males than for those
headed by females.
• Ownership of livestock reduces the probability of out-migration. It is the
poor who are prone to migrate.
• Families with large numbers of dependents are most likely to migrate, indi-
cating distress migration.
• The odds of migrating are higher where there is no access to a water source
within a village.
• In addition to the aforementioned factors, others contributed to high out-mi-
gration in two IFPRI survey villages that experienced high rates of migration
during the peak of the famine. These are captured in the dummy variables and
may reflect differential access to vegetation (pasture, free crops) and access
to outside sources of income such as remittances.
Livestock Response. The desire of farmers to protect a minimum viable number
of their livestock to ensure continuity of future productive capacity was evident in
their actions in 1984-85. They pursued a course that involved extensive change in
feeding sources and practices, a shift in the composition of livestock varieties, and
the movement of animals to areas perceived to have better pasture and water.







Age of head of household (in years)
Sex of head of household (1 if male,
0 otherwise)
Migration experience (1 if migrated
in previous season, 0 otherwise)
Per capita livestock, 1983 (LSU)
b
Adult-to-family ratio
Water source (1 if village has permanent
water source, 0 otherwise)
Village dummy (1 if village experienced
























Source: International Food Policy Research Institute survey, 1989.
"Evaluated at sample mean point.
bLSU » livestock unit.
cAn alternative measure of goodness of fit involves a correct classification of households as either migrating
or not. The model correctly classified 95.4 percent of the households.
*Significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
Variations between these principal responses were conditioned on the rapidity and
intensity of the drought, market conditions, and the resource capacity of the farm
population.
A great majority of the farmers in the survey area attempted to make up the
shortage of pasture by shifting to purchased feeds (at times this was done by selling
part of the livestock) or collected plants. Farmers also split their stocks, sending
some to distant areas for better grazing—a practice rarely followed by sedentary
farmers, particularly small-herd owners. However, access to permanent water
yards and better pasture routes was often limited to those who had a financial
advantage or social ties. As the drought continued, farmers' capacity to feed their
animals was increasingly constrained by shortages of pasture and water and rapidly
declining income capacity. Farmers had to dispose of their more valuable animals
to fetch the best price possible in the depressed market or to avoid imminent loss
due to livestock death.
The farmers engaged in large-scale dispossession of their livestock. The off-
take rates for these animals were much higher than the normal rates (Table 16).








Source: Based on data from Mohammed Abdel Gadir Mohammed, "The Impact of Emergency Food Aid on
Traditional Agricultural Production Systems—The Case of East Kordofan District" (M.S. thesis,
University of Khartoum, 1988).
Note: The estimated off-takes from the livestock population in El Obeid market in 1982 were cattle, 19
percent; sheep, 10 percent; goats, 3 percent; and camels, 8 percent (Louis Berger International
1983).
Such increased off-take was made possible by the sale of animals that often had not
been destined for market. The normal preference is to sell adult males, cows that
cease to produce or fail to give regular birth, and calves that are considered in
excess of what is necessary for replacement of stocks. This selectivity process
diminished in the 1984-85 period as farmers were forced to dispose of their
animals. These animals, weakened by starvation and disease, often fetched low
prices in the already depressed market.
Income Response. Farmers in the survey villages derive their income from
diverse sources, principally crop and livestock production, collected products,
transfers, and wage income. Within these income sources is a multitude of individ-
ual sources, but a few of them always dominate.
The relative position of these income sources in household income in 1988 is
shown in Table 17. Eighty-five percent of the average income is earned income.
Among agricultural income sources, crop production accounts on average for 30
percent. When it is combined with farm wage income, the average moves close to
37 percent. If livestock income is added, the average reaches 50 percent. Thus,
about half of the income of the survey population comes from rainfall-dependent
agricultural sources. The other important source of earned income is the sale of
collected products (firewood, poles, charcoal, and grass). Transfers play a crucial
stabilization role in a period of falling agricultural income—a recurrent event in
recent years.
A comparison of mean income variations shows significant disparity; the
high-income tercile has an income level that is four times higher than that of the
low-income tercile (Table 17). Female-headed households make less income on
average than male-headed households. Although poverty is widespread, it is not
uniform among the farm population.
No considerable differences are seen between high- and low-income groups in
their income composition, especially within earned-income categories. However,
there are important variations in the income shares of transfers and collected
products. Across genders, the important sources of differences are in crop and
transfer incomes. Crop production is a relatively significant income source for
male-headed households. Female-headed households tend to compensate for their






































































































































Source: International Food Policy Research Institute survey, 1989.
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the percentage of participating families in the sample.
aFigures for transfers include remittances.
low agricultural income largely through transfers. Handicrafts are a minor but
essential compensatory income source.
A considerable substitution between income sources was also evident in 1984-
85 (Table 18). When farmers faced failure in their crop income, they resorted to
sale of assets, collected products (grass, firewood, and so forth), and nonagricul-
tural income. A sizable fraction of the sample derived their income primarily from
liquidation of assets and nonagricultural sources (handicrafts and wage labor).
Receipts in the form of loans and transfers also enhanced their income. Those in a
better wealth position sold a large part of their assets (livestock and other house-
hold valuables). The asset-poor had to depend greatly on handicrafts and transfers
to augment their low income from sale of assets.
The observed income response of the sample households is that when a large
share of income is derived from crop-based activities (including wage income), all
households share a greater risk of income failure. The current protective income
sources (income from sale of collected products and transfers) are easily reversible

































Source: International Food Policy Research Institute survey, 1989.
aBottom and top terciles of distribution of livestock ownership in 1984-85
and nonsustainable, particularly when viewed in terms of their implications for the
environment. Furthermore, it is evident that the burden of coping is unequal and
falls heavily on those who depend largely on crop-based income and have few
protective income sources or assets. Households from the drier areas, especially
asset-poor households headed by women and those headed by the old without
working members, are at high risk.
To capture these factors that contribute to interhousehold income variations,
income determination equations were estimated relating per capita household in-
come to asset ownership, family labor, age of household head, sex of household
head, education of household head (binary variable for having formal education or
not), income source, and relative village effects in 1988/89. Estimates of variants
of the income model are in Table 19. Variant 1 explains per capita earned income.
Variants 2 and 3 are related to total income. Although transfer income may be
considered as exogenous to household decisionmaking, its large share may pose a
simultaneous bias problem. An alternate specification that was estimated without
share income is thus included in the table.
The results confirm key hypothesized relations: the wealth and size of the labor
force have major influences on household income; there is a gender bias in income
variations—female-headed households earn much lower income than male-headed
households; the education of the household head has an income effect; transfer
income is important, especially as a substitute for earned income; and villages in
the drier areas of the sample have much lower income per capita.
Consumption Response. The major diet component in the survey areas is
millet-based porridge (asida) served with sauce or milk. At times, bread from
sorghum (kisra) is served with a mild, spiced stew. An average family serves at
least two meals per day, usually in the late morning and late afternoon. A light meal
may be served in the evening. Hot tea is frequently served during the day, particu-
larly after meals.
The key food ingredients that contribute to this diet are millet (cereal),
cowpeas (legume), okra (vegetable), meat and milk (livestock products), sugar, tea,
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Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
aLSU = livestock unit.
*Significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
and oil (Table 20). The participation is weakly income variant, except for meat and
milk, which appear to rise with income level.
The consumption pattern observed in 1989 differs markedly from that practiced
during 1985. Families had to cut the frequency as well as the size of meals to ration
their food consumption in 1985 (Table 21).
3 About 70 percent of the sample
households reported that they had to cut their meal size. One out of three survived
3A survey conducted in September 1984 in three districts of Northern Kordofan (Hamid et al., n.d.)
shows that 40 percent of the sample had one or fewer meals during the survey period, compared with
2 percent a year earlier. Nineteen percent of the children had one milk serving a day before the survey,
compared with 44 percent a year ago.
49Table 20—Monthly expenditure per capita for frequently consumed food



































































































Source: International Food Policy Research Institute survey, 1989.
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of consuming households in the sample.
Table 21—Consumption responses of sample households, Kordofan survey
villages, 1985
TO. , Wealth Group"
Whole
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mally not eaten 17 14 19
Source: International Food Policy Research Institute survey, 1989.











38on a single meal. Approximately a quarter of the sample subsisted on a reduced
single meal. A greater percentage of these households were from the low-asset
group.
The composition of diets shifted largely to sorghum, wheat flour, meats, and
wild cereals and tree fruits (wild rice, kursan, nebag, and aradabe). Twenty-seven
percent of the sample resorted to consumption of wild rice and tree fruits. Fifty-
nine percent of these indicated that they would not have consumed these food items
in a normal year. Variation in consumption of these items was largely location-
specific. Consumption was much lower in the drier areas, where such plants are
less able to grow.
4
Millet, the main staple in the area, which is usually drawn from own stocks for
consumption, was not available in rural markets. Hence the rural population had to
depend greatly on the market to obtain its foods. Sorghum and wheat flour were
obtained largely from the market. Meats were obtained from own stock as well as
the market. Wild rice and tree fruits were partly collected and partly purchased
(wild rice—a misleading term, suggests availability at no cost).
4An OXFAM-UNICEF-Kordofan Government study (1985b) shows considerable district variation in
the percentage of households that consumed these foods: 79 percent in En Nahud, 63 percent in El
Obeid, and 33 percent in Sodari. The availability of such foods diminished northward—particularly
in the drier areas, where drought was intense.
51DROUGHT-PRODUCTION RELATIONSHIPS
The central thrust of this chapter is to establish a quantitative measure between
drought and production in the drought-famine chain (Figure 3). As a background,
the structure and development of Sudan's agriculture are discussed with emphasis
on the performance of cereal production. Trends in rainfall patterns are described,
and a model relating rainfall to production is then estimated at country and regional
levels, disaggregated by major crops.
Development of Agricultural Production
Agriculture accounted for 48 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in
1965. Its relative contribution declined to 39 percent in the 1974-78 period. In the
1980s, its share oscillated between 31 and 38 percent, with the lowest share occur-
ring in 1984 and 1987—the years notable for the lowest rainfall levels (Table 22).
Value added from crop production constitutes the principal source of GDP in
agriculture. The crop subsector contributed nearly 60 percent of the sector's value
added in the 1981-87 period. Within the subsector, the irrigated crops maintained a
relatively stable and large share (60 percent) in the 1980s. Their relative contribu-
tion was high in 1984 and 1987 because of a large drop in production of rainfed
crops.
The principal crops are cotton, sorghum, millet, wheat, sesame, and ground-
nuts. Cotton and wheat are irrigated crops grown mainly in the Gezira scheme in
Central Region. Cotton is the prime foreign exchange earner, while wheat is an
import substitute for the growing urban-based demand. Sorghum is the main staple





















































































Source: Based on data files of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Khartoum.
52crop throughout Sudan except in the provinces of Northern Darfur and Northern
Kordofan. Even though it is emerging as an important crop in the irrigated schemes,
it is mainly grown in rainfed areas under mechanized technology (Table 23).
Production is largely concentrated in the central plain that covers Eastern and
Central regions, Southern Darfur, and Southern Kordofan (Table 24). Millet and
sesame are rainfed crops. Millet, an important staple in the west, is nonmechanized
and grows mainly in Darfur and Kordofan (Table 23). Sesame is partly mechanized




























































Source: Sudan, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics (Khar-
toum: MANR, 1970, 1984, and 1987).






Source: Based on data files of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Department of Agricul-






























73.0and production is spread among Darfur, Kordofan, Central, and Eastern regions.
Groundnuts are grown in both irrigated and nonmechanized rainfed areas, but there
is a growing shift to irrigated areas, partly in response to low profitability in the
western regions, where rainfall is low and highly variable.
Livestock remains an important subsector, with a contribution of one-third of
agricultural GDP. Lack of consensus on growth estimates makes it difficult to
determine the actual livestock population in the country. The official estimates for
1985 reported 22.1 million head of cattle, 19.3 million sheep, 14.6 million goats,
and 2.8 million camels. Most of these stocks are concentrated in Central, Darfur,
and Kordofan regions. They are particularly important sources of employment and
livelihood for the nomadic population. Lower growth rates in the early 1980s
reflected the effects of 1980 droughts, which were characterized by high mortality
accompanied by lower birth rates, especially in the western regions (Table 25).
The crop and livestock components are the main influences on the agricultural
sector's relative performance. The agricultural GDP, for example, experienced a
record per capita fall of 26.4 percent in 1984 relative to the 1983 crop year—
assuming a 2.9 percent annual growth in population. There was a recovery in the
1985 season, but this was reversed in 1987. The performance of these components
was largely precipitated by continuous failures of rainfed crops and, as in the case
of the 1984 season, by large losses of livestock (Table 26).
Cereal Production Performance
Sorghum
Production of sorghum increased from an average of 1.3 million metric tons
5 in
the 1961-73 period to 2.2 million tons in the 1974-86 period (Table 27). Area under
sorghum increased from 3.9 million feddans to 8.1 million feddans over the same
































Source: Information from the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Animal Resources Econom-
ics Administration (these rates were applied to estimate livestock population for the period
1976-80, and FAO growth-rate estimates were applied for the 1981-85 period).
aThe growth rate shown here is contrary to the observations in the 1989 International Food Policy Research
Institute survey of Northern Kordofan villages, which showed a decreasing rate for the 1981-85 period.
5 All tons in this report are metric tons.
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Source: Based on data files of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Khartoum.
periods. Area growth averaged an annual rate of 5.3 percent (Table 28). Average
yield, on the other hand, experienced a steady decline from 348 kilograms to 273
kilograms per feddan over the 26-year period at an annual rate of -2.1 percent.
Production growth peaked in 1974-86 at a drought-excluding growth rate of 4.6
percent (Table 28). This occurred mainly as a result of a 6.3 percent growth in
cultivated area. Rapid expansion of mechanized farms, particularly in Central and
Eastern regions, contributed largely to the record growth. Production from these
farms grew at an annual rate of 7.7 percent, mainly due to 8.9 percent growth in
area (Table 29).
Growth was much lower when the effect of the 1984 drought was included in
the growth estimate. The growth rate for mechanized sorghum production dropped





















































Source: Based on data files of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Department of Agricul-
tural Economics, Statistics Section, Khartoum.






































Table 28—Growth rates of production, area, and yield of cereal crops in Sudan,
1961-86














Source: Based on data files of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Department of Agricul-
tural Economics, Statistics Section, Khartoum.
Note: Figures in parentheses are drought-free, that is, they exclude the 1984/85 season.
at-values are statistically significant for corresponding growth rates (parameter estimates are at least two
times the associated standard error).
Growth rates are not reported for lack of acceptable statistical significance.
to 4.4 percent due to a substantial drop in the rate of yield growth (Table 29). For
the nonmechanized areas, the 1984/85 season exacerbated the shortfalls in yield.
The only exception was the irrigated sector, which experienced positive growth
but, because of its small share, had a marginal impact on overall performance. The
overall effect of 1984/85 was a sluggish growth in sorghum production, largely
Table 29—Growth rates of sorghum production, area, and yield in Sudan, by
technology, 1961-86














Source: Based on data files of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Department of Agricul-
tural Economics, Statistics Section, Khartoum.














































(-0.5)attributed to the sharp drop in yield. There were sizable variations in growth
performance among the important production regions (Table 30). Regions with
better access to water—whether from rain or irrigation—demonstrated a lower
drop in yield growth.
Variation in production levels across the subperiods was associated with in-
creased instability. Fluctuations were more pronounced in the 1982-86 period. This
is illustrated by comparisons of indices in Table 31. Relative to the normal years of
Table 30—Average growth rates of production, area, and yield of food crops,
by main producing provinces, 1974-86












Gezira Central -17.8 -19.5 a
Source: Based on data files of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Department of Agricul-
tural Economics, Statistics Section, Khartoum.
Note: Growth estimates include the 1984/85 season.
aGrowth rates not reported for lack of statistical significance.







































































































Source: Based on data files of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Department of Agricul-
tural Economics, Statistics Section, Khartoum.
Note: Mean levels of production, area, and yield for the three crops in 1974-78 are sorghum—2.0 million
metric tons, 6.6 million feddans, 304 kilograms per feddan; millet—418,000 metric tons, 2.8
million feddans, 146 kilograms per feddan; wheat—260,000 metric tons, 616,200 feddans, 421
kilograms per feddan.
571974-78, production of sorghum increased in 1980 and 1981, dropped for the next
three years, and recovered strongly in 1985. Fluctuations in production mainly
reflect variability in yield.
Millet
Average annual production of millet increased from 328,000 tons in 1961-73 to
394,000 tons in 1974-86 (Table 27). For the whole 26-year period, no significant
production trend was established (Table 28). However, the area under millet in-
creased continuously, from 1.6 million feddans in 1961-73 to 3.0 million feddans
in 1974-86, at an average annual growth rate of 5.1 percent. Average yields
dropped over the same periods from 218 kilograms to 136 kilograms per feddan at
a growth rate of -4.3 percent.
The low-growth production path of millet was largely determined by the
drought years of the 1980s. Production showed an average growth rate of -4.2
percent in the 1974-86 period. The growth rate improves by 1.9 percent when the
1984/85 season is excluded (Table 28). Area planted grew at a rate of 2.7 percent,
but yield recorded a growth of -6.8 percent. Thus, despite an increase in area
planted to millet, yield decline overwhelmed the production trend. A large-scale
decline in production and yield occurred in the main production areas of Northern
Kordofan and Northern Darfur (Table 30).
Production of millet is marked by considerable and increasing year-to-year
variations. The greatest source of instability is related to yield variability. The
instability measure in Table 32 shows a 3-to-l ratio between yield and area
coefficients.
Wheat
Production of wheat is concentrated in the irrigated schemes, particularly in
Gezira. Like that of other irrigated crops, the annual production is governed by an























































Source: Based on data files of the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Department of Agricul-
tural Economics, Statistics Section, Khartoum.
Note: Computations are based on a general measure of instability developed by Cuddy and Valle (1978).
58administrative set of rules on area allocation, water use, and prices. Wheat is grown
in winter (rabi season) as part of a regular crop-rotation cycle. It usually follows
the summer crops of sorghum and groundnuts. The availability of water in the
winter months and relative allocation between competing crops, cotton in particu-
lar, determine much of its production performance.
Compared with the 1961-73 period, production as well as area reached higher
mean levels during 1974-86 (Table 27). Production grew from 100,000 tons to
203,000 tons. Area increased from 201,000 feddans to 440,000 feddans. Average
productivity, on the other hand, fell from 520 to 484 kilograms per feddan.
Wheat yield, unlike the yield of rainfed crops, registered positive growth, but
not enough to overwhelm the depressing effect of area contraction (Table 28). In
fact, area under wheat decreased continuously from 1976 to 1982, recovered in
1983 due to the addition of new areas, but dropped to a record low in 1984.
Production of wheat was banned in the Gezira scheme in 1984 because of the low
water level of the Blue Nile, which feeds two-thirds of the irrigated areas.
Records of growth patterns and performance among the three cereal crops show
some notable experiences (Tables 27-32). First, production growth has been largely
based on expansion of area. In the case of sorghum, this expansion has been
accompanied by rapid mechanization. For wheat, area contraction was the main
factor for poor performance in the 1974-86 period. Second, the contribution of
productivity to growth of production has been minimal. In fact, production growth
for most crops has occurred in an environment of declining productivity, particu-
larly for those crops that are grown in the nonmechanized rainfed system. Occur-
rences of droughts exacerbate the poor yield base of these crops. Finally, produc-
tion levels are associated with high relative variances. Sources of fluctuation
appear to be climate-based for rainfed crops, such as sorghum and millet, and
policy-induced in the case of wheat.
Rainfall Patterns in the Main Production Areas
Recorded rainfall data for 1960-86 covering selected areas located between 10°
00' and 14° 20' north latitudes and between 24° 20' and 35° 24' east longitudes are
examined in this section. The sampled areas cut across the regions of Darfur (El
Fasher and Nyala) and Kordofan (En Nahud and Kadugli), and the Central (Kosti,
Sennar, and Roseries) and Eastern (Gedaref) regions (Table 33). Kadugli, Kosti,
Sennar, Roseries, and Gedaref are important sorghum-production areas. Millet is
an important crop in the west, particularly in Darfur and Northern Kordofan
Province.
Mean total precipitation increases southward, and for localities on the same
latitude, rainfall tends to increase eastward. Similar patterns are observed for the
number of rainy days (Table 33). For most of the sample stations, the mean levels
for both total precipitation and number of rainy days show a declining pattern over
the 27-year period. The 10-year mean of annual precipitation in the 1970s was
below the 10-year mean of the 1960s in six of the eight sampled sites. The mean
levels of the early 1980s were far below those of the 1960s in all the sites. There
were also fewer rainy days in the 1970s and even fewer in the early 1980s as
compared with the 1960s (Table 34). The decline in rainfall totals appears to be











































































Source: Computed from raw data from the Sudan Meteorological Department, Khartoum.
associated with fewer rainy days. Such a pattern could contribute to the greater
propensity for drought to occur in areas where soils have low water-holding
capacity.
The annual distribution of rainfall shows that most of the rains occur in the
months between June and September. The months of July and August represent the
peak months and account for a large share of total precipitation. Ibrahim's (1984)
findings on Northern Darfur also reveal that annual precipitation curves are steeper
toward the north, that is, precipitation tends to be concentrated heavily in the wet
months, particularly in August.
Temporal variations in total precipitation are notable among the sample sites.
The coefficients of variation around estimated trends vary between 0.29 in El
Fasher and 0.14 in Roseries (Table 33). El Fasher (0.29), En Nahud (0.27), and
Kosti (0.24) show relatively high variability. El-Tom's (1986) findings also con-
firm considerable rainfall fluctuation in Khartoum, El Fasher, and El Obeid. Rela-
tive variation is more prominent in the arid and semi-arid climatic zones, especially
in the west.
The year-to-year fluctuations in rainfall increased considerably in the 1980s as
compared with earlier decades within these sample areas. The coefficients of
variation increased from a low of 0.13 in the 1960s to 0.33 in the 1970s and 0.34 in
the 1980s in El Fasher. In En Nahud, it progressed from 0.18 to 0.23 and 0.45 in the
three decades, respectively. A similar pattern was observed in Kosti (0.18 in the
1960s, 0.17 in the 1970s, and 0.32 in the 1980s), Nyala (0.18 in the 1960s, 0.16 in
the 1970s, and 0.29 in the 1980s), and Roseries (0.11 in the 1960s to 0.17 in the
1970s and 0.18 in the 1980s). The 1980s were definitely marked by large fluctua-
tions that were largely reflective of variations in the number of rainy days.
There are important issues of interest that are not evident in the studies dis-
cussed above. First, is the shift in the climatic pattern part of a cyclical phenome-
non? Second, how are low rainfall levels compatible with growth of food crops (by
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61type and variety) across the country's production zones? Finally, to what extent
does the spread of annual rainfall match the optimal growth cycle of crops? These
questions may be relevant in the context of the search for technological innovation
and commodity priorities in the drought-prone regions.
Drought-Production Relationships
The preceding discussion on the performance of cereal crop production in the
1980s highlights the adverse effects of drought on growth components, particularly
yields. The effect of drought on cereal production is largely mediated through the
short-run impact on yield. In this section, an attempt is made to isolate the system-
atic impact of rainfall through simple supply functions defined as
Qit = a0 + a, RAIN, + a2 (RAIN,)
2 + a3 PIt_, + a4 P.,., + a5 T + u,, (4)
where
Qit = production or yield of crop i in period t,
RAIN, = rainfall index in period t,
Pit.i
 = own deflated price in period t-1,
Pj,^ = price of competing crop j in period t-1,
T = time trend,
u, = random error term in period t, and
cc0, a,, a2, a3, a4, and a5 are parameters to be estimated.
Total annual rainfall for selected sites weighted by respective production
shares was used for aggregate cereals and sorghum. In the case of millet, however,
the relevant measure was total rainfall in the months of June, July, and August.
Weights were derived from production records of the 1974-86 period. Prices are
weighted regional wholesale prices. The gross national product (GNP) deflator was
used to deflate the prices. Price terms were dropped from yield equations due to
poor response. No price terms were included in millet equations due to lack of
complete series. All the variables were in natural logarithms. The choice of the
functional form was based on a preliminary evaluation of the values of the log-
likelihood function and the correlation coefficients between predicted and ob-
served values of the dependent variables for alternative functional forms.
The rainfall effect on production as well as yield is hypothesized to be positive
but to diminish at the margin. The square term of rainfall in the supply equation is
expected to take a negative sign. The time trend is used as a proxy for technology,
especially mechanization, and increased labor use.
Table 35 presents the parameter estimates and associated t-statistics. The
coefficients for the rainfall term are significant (t-ratios equal to or greater than 2.0)
in 13 out of 17 cases. Rainfall has a significant systematic impact on production
responses. The squared terms are also significant, and the signs suggest that rainfall
does affect production but at a diminishing rate. The trend variable has a significant
impact on yields for all-Sudan cereals, sorghum, and millet. Since adding price
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64price should explain the observed trend. In the case of production response, how-
ever, the effect of trend diminishes when price variables are included.
The corresponding elasticities evaluated at sample means are given in Table 36.
The elasticities measure the percentage change in production or yield for a 10
percent change in rainfall, adjusted for curvature effect. The results suggest that a
10.0 percent drop in annual rainfall results in a 5.0 percent and 7.3 percent drop in
cereal and sorghum production, respectively. The corresponding drops in yield are
3.7 and 5.4 percent. The elasticities are smaller for aggregate millet: 1.6 percent for
yield and 3.0 percent for production. Sorghum is more sensitive than millet to
rainfall changes.
The elasticities also suggest that regional/provincial production is more sensi-
tive to rainfall fluctuation than is aggregate production. Sorghum in Blue Nile
Province, for example, shows a 10.4 percent drop in yield compared with 5.4
percent for aggregate sorghum, and a 15.2 percent drop in production compared
with 7.3 percent for the aggregate. The greater response at the regional level also
holds for millet; compare 5.3 percent for millet yield in Northern Kordofan to 1.6
percent for aggregate millet yield. There are also significant interregional differ-
ences in elasticities for the same crop.
The effects of price changes on sorghum production can be read directly from
Table 35. A 10.0 percent increase in the price of sorghum results in a 5.2 percent
increase in production. The increase is 7.5 percent in the Blue Nile Province. A rise
in the relative price of sesame encourages farmers to move out from sorghum
production; a 10.0 percent increase in the price of sesame leads to a 3.3 percent cut
in aggregate sorghum production. The response is again greater in the Blue Nile
area, where farmers cut sorghum production by 4.8 percent for a 10.0 percent
























































Source: Calculated from the results in Table 26.
65PRICES AND MARKET DISCONNECTIONS
DURING FAMINES
It is of central importance for government policymakers to have a comprehen-
sive understanding of the functioning of markets during food-shortage situations
caused by domestic production decline. Understanding of the production-price
relationship provides a key input into policies regarding interregional trade, stock-
holding, and imports (including food aid). The following assessment of market
behavior during the past two decades pulls together some critical facts considered
as inputs for informed decisionmaking related to such policies and government
interventions.
The focus of this analysis will be on presenting factual information on price
development and establishing factors that contribute to such behavior. The main
components of price development are related to the evolution of absolute and
relative price movements, seasonality of prices, and regional price spread. The
shifts in relative prices between cereals and cash crops and between cereals and
livestock are important indicators of the erosion of purchasing power during food-
shortage situations. The pattern of seasonality of prices, which often follows local
production patterns, may change during a period of drought, giving rise to different
timing of sales and amplitude of price changes. The extent to which deviations
from normal patterns occur indicates the potential complementary role of other
sources of supply—imports, stocks, and food aid—in smoothing intrayear vari-
ations. Differences in interregional price variations hint at the key role of better
market integration through improved rural infrastructure. The short-term effects of
production and food availability declines on prices and terms of trade hint at the
critical need for a very rapid mobilization of resources and programs to cope with
the short-term food-security problem of the poor when drought hits.
Evolution of Food Prices
Price Levels
Cereal prices rose steadily in the early 1980s, peaked in 1984, and then dropped
in the 1985 and 1986 seasons (Table 37). Between 1982/83 and 1984, cereal prices
increased threefold. The real price in the 1985/86 season was at the level prevailing
in the 1970s (Figure 8).
A rapid price increase occurred in the months preceding the harvest season of
1984. The nominal price of sorghum in the El Obeid market in the west, for
example, increased from SD£32 to SD£57 and then to SD£137 per 100 kilograms
in the months of January, July, and October 1984, respectively (Table 38). The
price was nearly five times higher in October 1984 than in the same month in 1983.







































































Sources: Sudan, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Agricultural Prices in Sudan: A Historical
Review and Analysis, 1970-1984 (Khartoum: MANR, 1985); MANR, Agricultural Situation and
Outlook: 1986-1987 (Khartoum: MANR, 1987); and MANR, Current Agricultural Statistics:
1984/85 and 1985/86 (Khartoum: MANR, 1988).
Notes: Oedaref is in the Eastern Region, El Obeid is in Kordofan Region, and Nyala is in Darfur Region;
n.a. means not available.
aWeighted average of Gedaref sorghum and Nyala millet wholesale prices.
Cereal prices continued to increase and stayed at high levels until the harvest of
1985. By the end of the 1985 harvest, prices had dropped to as low as 30 percent of
the 1984 average.
The strong association of production and price variability in cereals in the short
run is also evident in the case of sesame. Its price increased in 1984, albeit
modestly compared with cereal crops, and continued to rise during the 1985 season
because of the poor harvest.
Figure 8—Cereal real price versus nominal price in Sudan, 1969/70-1985/86
Price/Kilogram
0.50 r-
Nominal Sudan cereal price in U.S. dollars (1969/70 = 100)
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Year
Source: Computed from price series data compiled from various publications of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and Natural Resources, Department of Agricultural Economics.
67Table 38—Average monthly wholesale prices for sorghum, millet, sesame,









































































Sources: Sudan, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Agricultural Prices in Sudan: A Historical
Review and Analysis, 1970-1984 (Khartoum: MANR, 1985); MANR, Agricultural Situation and
Outlook: 1986-1987 (Khartoum: MANR, 1987); and MANR, Current Agricultural Statistics:
1984/85 and 1985/86 (Khartoum: MANR, 1988).
Note: Gedaref is in the Eastern Region, El Obeid is in Kordofan Region, and Nyala is in Darfur Region.
The picture is different in the case of livestock. Prices of livestock dropped
significantly in 1984, particularly in the months that coincided with the peak rise in
cereal prices. In Nyala market in the west, the price of cattle per head dropped from
SD£254 in July 1984 to SD£142 in October 1984. The price reached SD£121 in El
Obeid market in January 1985. In rural markets, the price drop was much greater.
For example, in Bara market in Northern Kordofan, the price of cattle was down to
SD£48 per head in April 1985. Prices recovered strongly, however, and continued
to rise at a much faster rate after mid-1985. This dramatic price increase slowed
recovery, particularly among those who used to own small herds.
The patterns of these price movements remains unchanged even when they are
deflated to account for changes in the general price level. It is evident that 1984,
which witnessed large increases in cereal prices, was also a year of large increases
over the general price level of 1983. The increasing trends in the general price level
suggest that real commodity prices were lower than nominal prices but followed a
path similar to the movement of nominal prices.
Relative Price Movements
For farm households that grow cash crops or produce livestock, their purchas-
ing power and ability to acquire staple foods is largely determined by the terms of
trade between food and the households' farm produce for the market. Similarly, for
rural wage earners, the ability to acquire food depends considerably on the level of
food prices versus the (cash) wage rate. Data on rural wage rates are unfortunately
not available. Therefore, the following assessment concentrates on the terms of
trade between staple foods, on the one hand, and cash crops and livestock, on the
other.
68The relative price movements between sorghum and the two main cash crops—
sesame and groundnuts—are shown in Table 39. The evolution of these relative
prices reveals that the terms of trade deteriorated dramatically during the 1984-85
food shortage. For example, the terms of trade between sesame and sorghum in the
Central and Eastern regions fell from 0.73 to 0.32 between 1974-78 and 1984. This
suggests that the same amount of sesame could buy less than half (44 percent) as
much sorghum in 1984-85 as in the 1974-78 period. Similarly in Kordofan, the
terms of trade declined to 0.34 in 1984 from 0.56 in 1974-78. The deterioration was
much greater in the case of groundnuts. The price of groundnuts in terms of
sorghum dropped from 1.1 in 1974-78 to 0.54 in 1984 in Kordofan, that is, the same
amount of groundnuts could buy only half as much sorghum in the drought year of
1984. While cash crops tended to provide a reasonably reliable income source for
farmers in normal years, their contribution to real income in food-crisis years, such
as 1984-85, rapidly deteriorated.
The evolution of the terms of trade between cattle and sorghum and between
goats and sorghum is shown in Table 40. Goats are the most commonly owned
animals and provide an important source of income, particularly among the low-in-
come households. Cattle are the most preferred animals, particularly among pastor-
alists who are settled south of 13° north latitude.
The price of cattle in terms of sorghum continuously deteriorated over the years
until 1985, when there was a turnaround. The terms of trade were dramatically low
in 1984 compared with the previous years. Cattle producers could buy only about
one-tenth of the sorghum that they could in 1979 per head of cattle. In other words,
producers had to provide about 8 to 10 times more cattle to acquire the same
amount of sorghum in return in 1984 as in 1979. This was more or less consistently
the case in central Sudan as well as in Kordofan and Darfur regions. The deteriora-
tion in the terms of trade between cereals and small ruminants was comparatively
smaller.









































Sources: Sudan, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Agricultural Prices in Sudan: A Historical
Review and Analysis, 1970-1984 (Khartoum: MANR, 1985); MANR, Agricultural Situation and
Outlook: 1986-1987 (Khartoum: MANR, 1987); and MANR, Current Agricultural Statistics:
1984/85 and 1985/86 (Khartoum: MANR, 1988).
































































Sources: Sudan, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Agricultural Prices in Sudan: A Historical
Review and Analysis, 1970-1984 (Khartoum: MANR, 1985); MANR, Agricultural Situation and
Outlook: 1986-1987 (Khartoum: MANR, 1987); and MANR, Current Agricultural Statistics:
1984/85 and 1985/86 (Khartoum: MANR, 1988).
Seasonality of Prices
Regular intrayear variations in cereal prices follow a unimodal distribution in
conformity with the annual production cycle. In the case of sorghum, prices start
from seasonal lows in December as the new harvest comes into the markets. Prices
show modest rises in the consecutive months between January and May, then faster
growth in the wet-season months from July to October. The months between July
and October represent high points, with the peak in October (Table 41). The
seasonal price spread averages a monthly growth rate of 2 percent.

















































Source: Sudan, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Seasonal Movements in Sudan's Agricul-
tural Commodity Prices (Khartoum: MANR, 1988).
Notes: The indices were derived using 12-month centered moving average techniques applied to a multi-
plicative model, n.a. means not available.
70The months between December 1984 and October 1985 exhibited a marked
departure from regular seasonal behavior. The price of sorghum rose rapidly in the
postharvest months, shifting the seasonal high points to the months between Febru-
ary and June. In fact, record high prices were experienced during these months. The
price then dropped unseasonably low between August and October 1985. The
unseasonable price decline suggests revised expectations on the part of traders in
anticipation of a good harvest in 1985 or the injection of new supply into the
markets or both. In addition to shifts in the high and low months, the period
witnessed an average monthly growth of 10 percent in price. The seasonal ampli-
tude was dramatic compared with the regular seasonal increment of 2 percent a
month.
Intrayear variability in cattle prices is influenced by the north-south move-
ments of cattle-herding nomads. Sales of cattle begin to rise in July as these nomads
move into the vicinity of markets. Trading activity peaks in the months between
August and October, and these three months account for nearly 40 percent of
annual sales. Sales begin to fall off after October as the nomads return southward.
Trading in the months between November and January accounts for 25 percent of
annual sales. The period of lowest trading activity starts in February and continues
until June.
Monthly prices of cattle tend to follow the seasonal pattern of availability. The
price in the Nyala market begins to drop in July and stays at seasonal lows between
August and November. The price starts to rise in December and continues at a high
level until July (Table 41). On average, the price increases 16 percent from the
seasonal low in October.
The 1984/85 cattle prices in Nyala showed two periods of seasonal lows; the
first covered September through November and the second was from March
through June (Table 42). The second period coincided with the period of the failed

















Source: Based on data files of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, Khartoum.


























731984 harvest and is indicative of the presence of nomads and a large entry of
livestock into the market. A more dramatic pattern was, in fact, evidenced in a town
market in Bara district in Northern Kordofan, where the price decreased continu-
ously from October 1984 to April 1985. This district typifies areas hard hit by the
drought and poorly connected to regional markets.
Regional Market Disconnection
The price index for cereals for the whole country (computed as a weighted
average using production shares by region as weights for the prices prevailing in
the regions) is contrasted with the local price development in Kordofan and Darfur
regions in Figure 9. It reveals that, while many wide differences prevailed between
the regions when prices were not excessively high in the 1970s, the general price
movement during the food crisis in 1984-85 was apparently spread all over the
country. However, similar relative movements mean quite different absolute move-
ments in price levels across regions. This is highlighted by the evolution of the
interregional price differences of foodgrains in the case of sorghum. In the 1980s,
sorghum prices in Kordofan tended to be 20-25 percent higher than in the eastern
sorghum-producing area (Gedaref), and prices in Darfur tended to be more than
two times those in Gedaref, while they exceeded Kordofan prices by about 80
Figure 9—Price indices for Kordofan sorghum, Darfur millet, and Sudan cereals,
1969/70-1985/86
Price Index (1980 = 100)
500
El Obeid (Kordofan) sorghum price index
450 - — — — — Sudan cereal price index
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Year
Sources: Computed from price series data in Sudan, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
Department of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Prices in Sudan: A Historical Review and
Analysis, 1970-1984 (Khartoum: MANR, 1985); Agricultural Commodity Prices, 1985 Summary
(Khartoum: MANR, 1986); and Agricultural' Commodity Prices, 1986 Summary (Khartoum:
MANR, 1987).
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I I I I I Ipercent (see price ratios after 1982/83 in Table 43). Nevertheless, price wedges
between regions appear lower in the 1980s than in the 1970s. Thus, overall market
integration may have improved.
A statistical model based on the work of Ravallion (1986) and Timmer (1974)
is applied to examine some elements of market integration in grain and livestock
markets. The model postulates that changes in local market prices are caused by a
change in the spatial margin between local and reference markets, a change in the
temporal margin in the reference market, the level of price in the reference market,
and local specific factors. The specific equation chosen for estimation is
pit =
 ai Pi.-!
+ Pi (R, - R,-,)
+ e; R,-i
+ *i D85 + r x + uit, (5)
where
P.t = monthly wholesale price in market i in period t,
Rt = reference market monthly wholesale price in period t,
D85 = dummy variable (1 for month in 1984-85; 0 otherwise),
X = vector of local specific market-conditioning factor, and
Uit = random error term in market i in period t.











































































Sources: Sudan, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Agricultural Prices in Sudan: A Historical
Review and Analysis, 1970-1984 (Khartoum: MANR, 1985); MANR, Agricultural Situation and
Outlook: 1986-1987 (Khartoum: MANR, 1987); and MANR, Current Agricultural Statistics:
1984/85 and 1985/86 (Khartoum: MANR, 1988).
73The parameter ps measures the proportional change in the local price caused by a
change in the temporal margin in the reference market. A sizable positive value
indicates that local prices track with movements in reference market prices, that is,
traders monitor changes in reference market prices and adjust local prices accord-
ingly. 0j measures the influence of the reference market price level (R) on local
prices. An increase in the price level may induce local traders to adjust accordingly,
particularly in an environment experiencing rapidly increasing prices. 4>j captures
the effects of unseasonal price movements in the 1984-85 period. The vector T
captures the proportional contribution of factors specific to local price changes.
It is plausible to assume that in the Sudan case the principal regional markets
exhibit marked long-term price relationships. A study in Darfur, for example,
concludes that the informal market information network among traders is very
strong (Darfur Regional Government 1988). The existence of such communication
flows suggests that the P( coefficient may be close to 1, that is, there is a neutral
proportional change. But a high Pj may simply reflect the effect of general eco-
nomic and market forces that show up in apparent market integration (similar to the
argument applicable to the coefficient of correlation measure). It may be possible,
however, that traders may fail to connect markets through commodity flows in the
short run. Therefore, Timmer's indirect but more general measure of market inte-
gration is invoked here. It is defined as the ratio of the local market coefficient (a;)
to the reference market coefficient (6;), that is,
Index of Market Connection (IMC) = aJQ{. (6)
An IMC greater than 1 indicates poor connection across markets. The relative
contributions of local price history are the primary factors in the current level of
local prices. An extreme case where the IMC is °° implies that markets are seg-
mented (6 = 0). An IMC of less than 1 implies a high degree of market connection.
The IMC indicates greater connection as it approaches zero, and when IMC = 0, it
suggests that changes in reference market prices are fully reflected in local prices
in the short run (6 = 1 and a . = 0).
In order to test the extent of market integration in sorghum and cattle markets,
four principal regional markets were selected—Nyala in Darfur Region, El Obeid
in Kordofan Region, Omdurman in Central Region, and Gedaref in Eastern Region.
Omdurman is the main terminal market for cattle. Large supplies of cattle come
from the western regions through the Nyala and El Obeid markets. Gedaref is both
the main producer and the main market for sorghum. Even though El Obeid market
is largely supplied from the surrounding areas, particularly Southern Kordofan
Province, there is sizable competition for trading between the regions.
Changes from month to month in the price of cattle in Nyala and El Obeid were
related to Omdurman monthly prices for the period 1981-86. El Obeid market was
also used as the reference for the Nyala market. El Obeid sorghum wholesale prices
were also related to Gedaref prices for the 1982-86 period. A choice of one month
as a time interval is considered a reasonable span for the flow of information and
commodities in Sudan's context. This assumption may need to be relaxed for cattle.
All the variables are in logarithms, following the tradition of previous work. The
parameter estimates of equation (5) are given in Table 44. A summary of measures
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75Table 45—Index of market integration for sorghum and cattle regional
markets, 1982-86
Regional Reference



















Source: Computed from regression coefficients in Table 44.
Note: Bj represents a measure of the proportional change in the local price caused by a change in the
temporal margin in the reference market. IMC (index of market connection) represents the ratio of
the local market coefficient (ctj) to the reference market coefficient (6j).
The statistical significance of the Pj and 6j coefficients suggests that commod-
ity markets are not segmented. In fact, the high P; coefficients for sorghum and
cattle show that the regional markets in the west have a strong long-term integra-
tion with the principal markets in the Central and Eastern regions. Inclusion of
dummy variables for the 1984-85 months had little impact on the stability of the
coefficient estimates. The price effect of 1984 was nonlocalized and did not have
an impact on overall market integration.
Traders have a well-functioning information network for following price devel-
opments in distant regional markets. Such an information flow is not, however,
complemented by strong connections in the short term. The IMC ratios are greater
than 1 for all markets, except those between Nyala and El Obeid. The connections
are particularly poor for cattle markets and are worst for Nyala, the most distant
market. It is estimated that about 95 percent of the animals traded between western
Sudan and other regions are trekked. The route from Nyala to Omdurman is about
1,400 kilometers, and the journey takes about 60 days during the rainy season
(Babiker 1986), which partly explains the poor connection.
Markets appear to operate and to transmit price signals across regions. Even
though such long-term regional price relationships exist and remain unaffected in
periods of acute production shortfalls, poor market connections preclude markets
from clearing at low levels because of high market-transaction costs. Transporta-
tion alone accounts for, on average, 10-15 percent of consumer price. A sample of
market areas shows that the share of transportation ranges between one-fifth and
nearly one-half of total marketing costs (Table 46). Ahmed and Rustagi (1987) also
conclude, on the basis of their survey of African countries, that the share of
transport varies from 35 to 50 percent of the total marketing cost. Moreover, they
point out that the absolute transport cost in marketing is about twice as high in
Africa as in Asia. This cost is largely associated with the poor road network, which
is also evident from the comparison of transport shares in the sample of eastern and
western market areas in the present study. The transport cost share is higher in
western market areas, where the rural road network is less developed (Figure 10).
Other principal marketing cost components are storage and cost premiums
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7778marketing costs. The weight loss component of the marketing cost is greater for
millet than for sorghum. Poor storage practices for millet contribute, for example,
to a low price in the wet season, when other crops are at their height. In general,
significant seasonal price variation due to the high cost of transfer across time
characterizes cereal prices in Sudan.
Although information on the actual marketing costs during the food crisis is not
available, it is clear that marketing costs were prohibitive in many instances where
people were prepared to move to the food rather than expecting that the food would
move to the people who still had the required purchasing power. A large share of
the interregional migration is due to drought and food shortage, especially in
western Sudan, where there is the combined effect of lack of food and lack of
employment locally.
Short-Term Price Flexibility in
Cereal-Livestock Terms of Trade
When drought hits an industrialized country with well-developed infrastruc-
ture, farm price increases of 10-20 percent, such as occurred in the 1988 drought in
the United States, are considered large. Adjustments in stockholdings and trade
permit a considerable degree of price stabilization under such conditions. Doubling
or trebling of prices, as happened during the 1984 drought in Sudan, appears to be
largely production-driven.
The key points quantitatively tested in the study are the degree to which
production fluctuations—which were determined to be much influenced by the
drought events above—result in price fluctuations, and the extent to which trade
(including food aid) and stockholding are able to mitigate the fluctuations. The
price-formation process is certainly complex and, in principle, requires a simulta-
neous look at the supply and demand sides and all the factors that determine each
of these as well as due consideration of the expectations of agents on the supply and
demand side of the market equations. With given data limitations, rather simple
approaches are chosen here to explain price flexibility. The focus is on annual price
fluctuations, and the demand side is not explicitly modeled. To the extent that
short-term purchasing power is affected by production volume and price-level
changes as well as price-ratio change (that is, cereal-livestock terms of trade), these
are implicitly taken into account in the reduced-form model estimates chosen. First,
an attempt is made to explain current-year cereal prices (in real terms) by total
domestic supply and the previous year's ending stock levels:
PICER = f(CERSt, STOCK,.,), (7)
where
CERS, = CERP, + IMP, + FAID, - EXPt,
PICER, = index of the Sudan cereal price (deflated
production-weighted mean of regional
prices) in year t,
STOCK,., = level of cereal stocks per capita at end of
year t-1 (or beginning-year stocks), in kilo-
grams,
79CERP, = cereal production per capita in year t, in
kilograms,
IMP, = imports per capita in year t,
FAID, = food aid per capita in year t,
EXP, = net of exports per capita in year t, and
CERS, = total supply of cereals per capita from pro-
duction (CERP,), imports (IMP,), net of ex-
ports (EXP,), and food aid (FAID,).
Second, the extent to which domestic production alone drives the price fluctua-
tions is tested by excluding the trade and aid component from equation (7), that is,
setting the index of cereal price as a function of current production per capita and
previous-year cereal stocks per capita:
PICER = f(CERP,, STOCK,.!). (8)
The same model estimation exercise is then repeated for the cereal-livestock
terms of trade as
CLTOT, = f(CERS,, STOCK,.,), and (9)
CLTOT, = f(CERP() STOCK,.,). (10)
The models hypothesize that the real price index of cereals increases with a
drop in domestic cereal production in the same year, but decreases when the last
year's ending stocks or current year's opening stocks, respectively, are increased.
Similarly, it is hypothesized that the terms of trade between cereals and livestock
commodities are largely driven by the same set of hypotheses. The determinants of
the cereal-livestock terms of trade may in fact be even more complex than the
determinants of cereals' real price development because of the complex interac-
tions between cereal markets and livestock markets, the differential effects of
drought on cereal and livestock supply (distress sales of livestock drive prices
down), and the adverse effects of increased cereal prices on the demand for
livestock commodities by households. Again, a rather simple approach is taken
here due to data limitations. The parameter estimates and estimation results are
presented in Table 47.
With the help of the estimated parameters, the effects of a change in production
of -10 percent and -30 percent, as well as a similar change in stocks, were derived
for the cereal price and for the terms of trade. The results suggest that a drop of 30
percent in cereal production per capita raises cereal prices by 78 percent (equation
[8] in Table 48). The order of magnitude is similar, resulting from a drop of 30
percent in production, for the cereal-livestock terms of trade: the terms of trade will
increase by 57 percent (equation [10]). Holding other things constant, a decrease of
30 percent in cereal stocks would raise prices by 24 percent and the terms of trade
by 18 percent. Similar models were run separately for Kordofan and Darfur, and
these showed, relatively speaking, somewhat lower effects of local production
fluctuations for local prices and local terms of trade, respectively. Given some
domestic interregional trading, this outcome should be expected (Table 48).

















































cereal production per capita, in kilograms;
= total supply of cereals per capita from production, imports,
net of exports, and food aid;
STOCK,_y = level of cereal stocks per capita at end of year t-1, or
beginning year stocks, in kilograms;
PICER = index of the Sudan cereal price (deflated production-
weighted mean of regional prices); and
CLTOT = cereal-livestock terms of trade.
The main conclusion from this analysis is that, as a 1 percent drop in production
at the national level tends to lead to about a 2.0-2.5 percent increase in prices in the
short term, policies for production stabilization, stockholding, and facilitation of
interregional trade are of critical importance. It may be most difficult to increase
the short- and medium-run stability in cereal production given the dominance of the
rainfed sector in this production. A fresh look at optimum storage levels, at
Table 48—Effects of production and stock changes for cereal prices and














































Source: Computed from mean values of variables and parameters in Table 47.
81investment in rural infrastructure for interregional trade, and at the option of
stabilization through international trade in cereals requires consideration (see
Pinckney 1989 on this issue). Research into the trade-offs between these options,
which are not further explored here, could have a high payoff.
Price fluctuations are found to be driven predominantly by production fluctua-
tions. The respective parameters estimated for CERS (total supply, including trade)
change very little if production only is substituted (compare CERP and CERS
parameters in Table 47). In fact, the explanatory power of the model decreases
when total supply, rather than production only, is considered in the specification.
Such a decrease may be explained by the timing of trade (aid) arrivals within the
year, but this is only speculation.
82IMPLICATIONS OF DROUGHT AND FAMINE
FOR CONSUMPTION AND NUTRITION
Available evidence on Sudan suggests that households respond in varying
degrees to income and price changes. The poor spend more than richer households
on staple crops and are much more responsive to price and income changes. Hence,
adjusting to drought-induced price and income changes is harder for the poorer
households. An attempt is made here to pool available information on food and
nutrient consumption in order to review and assess the impact of the 1984 drought,
especially the aggregate and distributional effects of the drought on food and
calorie demand and on nutritional-status indicators.
Food and Nutrient Consumption Practices
The studies reviewed here are based on a 1978-80 household consumption and
expenditure survey (Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 1982).
This chapter benefited from the work of Yisehac Yohannes (1989). The raw data
from Darfur and Kordofan in the 1978-80 survey are utilized here for the first time
to derive income and price response parameters. The information from these
studies establishes the "normal" consumption situation preceding the 1984-85
famine.
The Sudanese spent about two-thirds of their average income on food during
the 1978-80 period (Tables 49 and 50). There are, however, notable variations in


























Sources: Based on Angus Deaton and Anne Case, Income Distribution, Poverty, Expenditure Patterns and
Price Elasticities in the Sudan, Report to the USAID mission to Sudan, 1985; and data files from
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Khartoum.
83Table 50—Per capita expenditure and income, family size, food share, and















































































Source: Based on data tape from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Department of Statistics,
Khartoum.
the size of these shares among regions. A comparison of urban and rural Khartoum
shows that the rural population allocated more of its income to food. The shares
across provinces appear to follow the expected inverse relation between income
level and food share, except for the western provinces of Northern Kordofan and
Northern Darfur, and White Nile Province in Central Region. Shares were greater
in Blue Nile and Nile provinces relative to Gezira and urban Khartoum, reflecting
partly the low income level in the Nile provinces.
The expected inverse relationships are more regular among income groups
within the same regions. In Northern Kordofan, for example, the poorest house-
holds (those in the bottom 25 percent of income distribution) allocated, on average,
14 percent more of their income to food than did the upper 25 percent (Table 50).
The same pattern of behavior in the food share is observed in the Northern Darfur
sample. In fact, share elasticity estimates for these provinces range between -0.44
(Northern Kordofan) and -0.45 (Northern Darfur); that is, food share drops by 0.5
percent for a 1.0 percent increase in per capita expenditure. Income allocated to
food decreases at the margin with an increase in income level.
The average person in the west, particularly in Northern Kordofan and North-
ern Darfur, spent no less than 30 percent of the food budget on cereals (Table 51).
Millet was the most prominent item in the food budget. Sorghum, the dominant
staple in central and eastern Sudan, was a distant second, averaging about 10
percent in the west. Other important food groups were sugar, vegetables, and
meats. A relatively high share of sugar in the food budget is characteristic of a
Sudanese diet.
The allocation of food budgets across these food components appears to vary
with income level. The case of Northern Darfur in 1978-80 is presented in Table
52. The food shares for cereals decline with income—from 45 percent in the lowest



























































Source: Based on Yisehac Yohannes, "Food Consumption Patterns in Western Sudan, 1978-80," Famine
and Food Policy Discussion Paper 1 (International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington,
D.C., 1990, mimeographed).
aCereals are sorghum, millet, maize, wheat, barley, rice, and others.
Cereal products are wheat flour, kisra, and bread.
cBeverages are nonalcoholic drinks, tea, and coffee.
Table 52—Variation in food budget shares in Northern Darfur, by expenditure
group, 1978-80
Expenditure Group"
Food Low Medium High
(percent)
Cereals 45.50 30.75 23.42
Sorghum 16.75 2.44 0.63
Millet 28.52 27.52 20.63
Vegetables 6.33 7.91 8.26
Milk 2.28 2.81 3.31
Meat 13.35 16.13 15.61
Sugar 9.03 15.41 17.65
Beverages 2.31 3.58 5.03
Oils and fats 5.39 8.24 7.90
Condiments 3.92 4.48 5.49
Other 11.89 10.69 13.33
Source: Based on data tape from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Department of Statistics,
Khartoum.
aLow refers to the bottom 25 percent of expenditure distribution, medium to the 50th to 75th percentile, and
high to the top 25 percent. The remaining 25 percent were not reported.
income bracket to 23 percent in the highest. The poor in this region thus tend to
concentrate on cereals. The shares of other food groups, notably vegetables, meats,
and sugar, appear to increase with income.
The behavior of these shares across income levels also establishes that these
food groups are income-sensitive. Measuring such responses and drawing infer-
85ences are, however, tenuous exercises given the weak data base. Notwithstanding
such qualifications, this study pooled selected demand elasticity estimates from
other studies based on the same 1978-80 survey data in other provinces of Sudan
(Table 53). The studies are not quite comparable in commodity coverage, location,
and demand forms; however, they provide some noticeable patterns. First, the food
groups are responsive to changes in relative prices and income level. Second, price
and expenditure elasticities decline as average income level rises and the discre-
tionary component of household budgets increases with income. The large drop of
the expenditure elasticity in urban Khartoum may reflect the increasing diversity of
foods and declining share of cereals in the food budget. The elasticities in urban
Khartoum present lower bounds for the country. Cereals, for example, have an
attribute of a normal good (that is, positive income elasticity), and higher coeffi-
cients are expected in other regions. Third, cereal products, sugar, and tea are more
income-responsive than cereals. This is consistent with observed food share and
income relation in Northern Darfur.
The nutritional dimension of these food groups contributes information essen-
tial for understanding variation in nutritional status among the population. The last


































































Sources: Based on Pinstrup-Andersen et al., "Impact of Changes in Income and Food Prices on Food
Consumption by Low-Income Households in Urban Khartoum with Emphasis on the Effect of
Changes in Wheat-Bread Points" (International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington,
D.C., 1983, mimeographed); and Angus Deaton and Anne Case, Income Distribution, Poverty,
Expenditure Patterns and Price Elasticities in the Sudan, Report to the USAID mission to Sudan,
1985.
aStratum 1 is 12.5 percent of the survey households with the lowest total expenditure per capita; strata 2, 3,
and 4 are each the next highest 12.5 percent; and stratum 5 is the highest 50 percent.
Pinstrup-Andersen et al. reported income elasticities, while Deaton and Case estimated expenditure
elasticities.
cExcluding the western regions of Darfur and Kordofan.
86column in Table 50 shows that the average daily energy consumption exceeds
2,400 calories in Northern Kordofan and Northern Darfur. If one assumes a thresh-
old of 2,100 calories, availability of calories was adequate on average in these
provinces in the 1978-80 period.
The cereal crops as a group contributed over 65 percent of the calorie level
(Table 54). Millet, the predominant staple in the west, was the main source,
contributing about half.
Despite average adequacy, however, calorie consumption was uneven across
expenditure groups (see Table 50 for the west and Table 55 for urban Khartoum).
Households in the lowest expenditure distribution were prone to calorie deficiency.
Large variations, however, were not found only in households with low income. A
previous study on urban Khartoum (Pinstrup-Andersen et al. 1983) identified the
key attributes of calorie-deficient households as related to large family size, low
allocation of income to food, and choice of diet (Table 55). Their findings show
that the poor had large families and (unlike the calorie-deficient) spent more on
food and placed a high priority on cheap calories. Calorie deficiency is, therefore,
not strictly income-determined. If, however, one speculates that it is the poor who
are likely to face low degrees of freedom in their income uses or pay high search
costs to identify low-cost diets, or both, the calorie-deficient may then be found to
be concentrated among the poor. Further inquiry is made into this with a directly
specified calorie-consumption function of the form
lnPCDCL = p0 + Pj lnPCEXP + p2 lnPCEXP
2 + p3 HHSZ + p4 PRCE, (11)
where
lnPCDCL = natural log of per capita daily calories,
lnPCEXP = natural log of annual per capita expenditure,
lnPCEXP
2 = square term of lnPCEXP,
HHSZ = household size,
Table 54—Share of food components in total calories, by province, 1978-80
Northern Northern Southern











































2.10Table 55—Variation in income, expenditure, calorie consumption, family size,
food share, and calorie price, urban Khartoum, 1978-80
Per
Total Per Capita
Population Income Calorie Family Capita Expendi- Food Calorie




































































































Source: Based on Pinstrup-Andersen et al., "Impact of Changes in Income and Food Prices on Food
Consumption by Low-Income Households in Urban Khartoum with Emphasis on the Effect of
Changes in Wheat-Bread Points" (International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.,
1983, mimeographed), Tables 1-11.
aStratum 1 consumes below 80 percent of requirements; stratum 2, 80-100 percent; stratum 3, 100-120
percent; and stratum 4, above 120 percent.
PRCE = price of millet for Northern and Southern
Darfur, and price of sorghum for Northern
Kordofan, and
Po> Pp 02> 03»
 an£* P4
 ar
e parameters to be estimated.
Each equation is related to per capita expenditure, household size, and price of
main cereal crop. The equations were estimated using the 1978-80 data from the
western provinces. The parameter estimates and associated t-statistics are reported
in Table 56. Both the linear and quadratic terms of income are statistically signifi-
cant. The signs suggest that income has a positive but diminishing effect on calorie
consumption. Household-size signs are negative but significant only in the Darfur
sample. The signs are consistent with the observation that households with compa-
rable incomes but larger families consume fewer calories on average. The price of
millet has a significant inverse effect on calorie consumption, reflecting its impor-
tance in the diets of the western provinces.
Elasticity estimates evaluated at sample means are given in Table 57. Calorie
income elasticities range between 0.36 and 0.58. The elasticities imply that a 1.0
percent increase in per capita expenditure translates on average into an increase in
calorie consumption between 0.36 and 0.58 percent. An increase in the price of
millet has the opposite effect. A 1.0 percent increase in the price results on average
in a drop in calories of 0.29-0.36 percent. If one accepts the inverse relation
hypotheses (for example, Pinstrup-Andersen and Caicedo 1978; Timmer and
Alderman 1979), these responses would be higher among poor households.


















































Source: Based on data tape from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Department of Statistics,
Khartoum.
Note: The figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
"Definitions of variables:
lnPCEXP - natural log of annual per capita expenditure;
lnPCEXP
2 = square term of lnPCEXP;
HHSZ = household size;
PRCE = price of millet for Northern and Southern Darfur,
























Source: Yisehac Yohannes, "Food Consumption Patterns in Western Sudan, 1978-80," Famine and Food
Policy Discussion Paper 1 (International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C., 1990,
mimeographed).
"Estimated parameter is not significant.
The observed empirical food and calorie demand behavior are largely compa-
rable with studies in other low-income countries (Waterfield 1985; Pinstrup-
Andersen 1985; Alderman 1986; Svedberg 1987). Low-income households spend
a large share of their income on food. Income elasticities for food decline with
income level. Low-income households are also sensitive to price changes. Food
price changes cause more consumption adjustment among the poor because of their
large food share and income elasticity. In other words, the burden of adjustment
falls heavily on the low-income households in a period of food scarcity. Calorie
elasticities also appear to fall with rising income. Svedberg's (1987) review of
literature on microlevel studies on Africa highlights these relationships. Moreover,
it stresses that calorie deficiency is a more serious problem and tends to be more
unstable in villages located in unimodal and semi-arid zones. Infants and small
children are the most at risk when it comes to malnutrition or undernutrition.
89Decline in Food Availability
The absence of time-series data poses an information constraint to studying
disaggregated Sudanese food consumption patterns over time. The best that may be
done is to use an aggregate measure of food availability from food-balance-sheet
estimates. Available food consumption estimates are derived from the aggregation
of net domestic production available less net trade and net stock changes. These
estimates in general set the upper bounds to actual consumption levels. FAO-based
estimates are used here to examine the behavior of aggregate food consumption
over time.
Cereal-food availability in Sudan is much determined by domestic staple food
production (Figure 11). Domestic food production contributes on average 90 per-
cent of total cereal consumption. There are, of course, marked variations among the
Figure 11—Per capita food consumption in Sudan, 1969/70-1985/86
Kilograms/Year
"~ ^^—^— Per capita consumption
Sudan per capita production
Per capita net imports
— — — Per capita stock changes
Per capita food aid














1969/70 1971/72 1973/74 1975/76 1977/78 1979/80 1981/82 1983/84 1985/86
Year
Sources: Compiled and computed from Sudan, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Yearbook
of Agricultural Statistics (Khartoum: MANR, 1977 and 1984); Current Agricultural Statistics, vol.
1, no. 4 (Khartoum: MANR, 1984); Agricultural Situation and Outlook, Annual Report, 1984/1985
(Khartoum: MANR, 1985); and Agricultural Situation and Outlook, Annual Report, 1986/87
(Khartoum: MANR, 1987); Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Office for
Special Relief Operations, Democratic Republic of Sudan, Report of the FAO/WFP Multidonor
Mission, Assessment of the Food and Agricultural Situation, OSRO Report 02/85/E (Rome: FAO,
1985); Agricultural Trade Yearbook (Rome: FAO, various issues); Food Aid in Figures (Rome: FAO,
various issues); and "Food Supply Utilization Data Tape for Sudan," FAO, Rome, 1984.
90individual cereal crops. Millet, the preferred crop in the west, is consumed solely
from domestic production. The same applies to sorghum, which is largely con-
sumed in the central, eastern, and southern regions. In fact, the nation registered a
surplus production of sorghum in the late 1970s and 1980s and managed to export
or build reserve stocks or both. The relative contribution of domestic production to
wheat consumption is much lower, averaging 39 percent in the 1980s. Yet wheat is
central to the policy debate in Sudan because of its relative preference among the
urban population in greater Khartoum and other urban areas.
Relative contributions of imports and domestic stocks play a minor role in
annual millet and sorghum availability. Years of large production shortfalls like
1982-84 are exceptions. Production as a share of consumption fell to a low 75
percent in 1984. To cope with the shortages, the government adopted a mix of
measures, such as banning export of sorghum, drawing down reserve stocks, and
appealing for outside support, which came largely in the form of grants and
concessionary imports. In fact, the dwindling domestic production of wheat in the
1980s was made up largely from increased concessionary imports, which averaged
88 percent in the period between 1982 and 1986. These components are likely to
remain important sources for the government to fall back on in periods of poor
harvests.
Moreover, while Sudan traditionally faces a problem of extreme fluctuations in
stocks, there also seem to have been increases in these fluctuations in the 1980s
(Figure 12). (It should be noted that official stock figures are not all comprehen-
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Sources: Compiled and computed from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Trade
Yearbook (Rome: various issues); FAO, Office for Special Relief Operations, Democratic Republic
of Sudan, Report of the FAO/WFP Multidonor Mission, Assessment of the Food and Agricultural
Situation, OSRO Report 02/85/E (Rome: FAO, 1985); and "Food Supply Utilization Data Tape
for Sudan," FAO, Rome, 1985.
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I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Isive.) In view of the increased production fluctuations, the policies for stockhold-
ing and trading have certainly become more complex, and management of trade and
stocks has become a much larger issue in terms of volume, fiscal costs, foreign
exchange implications, and national human welfare.
Food availability per capita declined notably between 1970 and 1986. The
annual growth rate was a significant -1.4 percent, largely reflecting the low growth
in production relative to population. The trend diminishes (-0.7 percent) when the
effect of the 1984 drought is controlled for, which evidences the strong adversity
of the drought-production effect on cereal consumption. Average per capita cereal
consumption dropped from a high of 100 kilograms in 1976 to 78 kilograms in
1983 and to 51 kilograms in 1984. The years 1985 and 1986 witnessed marked
recovery but not to the magnitude of the prefamine level.
Incidence of the 1984-85 Famine
Aggregate declines in per capita consumption may not be accompanied by
proportional drops across socioeconomic groups. In fact, the evidence shown
above suggests that demand responses are varied. Of course, one needs a disaggre-
gated demand matrix to trace the effects of, say, the 1984 drought on food and
nutrient consumption across income groups. Such estimates should also preferably
be reflective of behavior during the adjustment period. No such empirical estimates
exist to assess drought-induced hunger effects.
Nevertheless, the demand estimates based on 1978-80 data could be used to
approximate the hunger effects. Suppose the hunger indicator is calorie consump-
tion below a certain level. The effect of change in rainfall on calorie consumption
can be approximated through a recursive relationship of rainfall to production to
calorie/price and calorie/income.
6 For example, the effect of a 10 percent change in
rainfall in western Sudan translates into an average 3.5 percent reduction in calorie
consumption. Note that these values are on the lower bounds, since the calorie
elasticities are lower in the long run than in the short run.
6These relations can be depicted for
price effect = nCRp = ncp • npQ • nQR , income effect = HCRI
 = ICY "YQ ' IQR >
 an<^
total effect = qCR = nCRP
 + 1CRI >
where
qCR = calorie elasticity with respect to rainfall index
(P - price effect, I = income effect),
ncp = calorie elasticity with respect to price,
Hpq = price elasticity with respect to production,
HQR
 = output elasticity with respect to rainfall index,
HCY
 = calorie elasticity with respect to income, and
H YQ
 = income response with respect to cereal produc-
tion (it is assumed that cereal-based income
accounts directly and indirectly for nearly 80
percent of rural household income).
92Nutrition-based sample surveys were also carried out widely in western Sudan
in 1985 and 1986. These surveys were based on anthropometric measures of change
in weight relative to height of children under five years old. The measures were
compared with standard reference groups in order to identify groups that would
qualify for food distribution and supplementary feedings and to monitor the nutri-
tional effects of severe food shortages during the droughts. Examination of these
results provides an additional dimension of the extent to which the droughts
affected the population.
The OXFAM-UNICEF nutritional surveillance project, which was imple-
mented in collaboration with the regional governments of Kordofan and Darfur,
presents a more complete and consistent picture of the situation in 1985 and early
1986 (Table 58). By early 1985, about 13 percent of the children in Northern
Kordofan were malnourished, that is, under 80 percent of the WHO/NCHS stand-
ard. The proportion peaked at 25 percent in mid-1985 and then dropped to 11
percent during the 1985 harvest. The situation markedly improved by early 1986
when it reached 7.5 percent. Within Northern Kordofan, the children in Bara and
Sodari and north of Um Ruwaba district were relatively more malnourished, that is,
those in the northern arid region were severely at risk.
The link between price change and child malnutrition is depicted in Figure 13.
The dramatic deterioration of purchasing power caused by unfavorable changes in
terms of trade was translated into increased incidence of severe child malnutrition
in Kordofan. The market strongly affected the poor, and children in particular.
The price effects of the 1984 drought were also transmitted to the urban
population despite numerous government interventions with the subsidy and ra-
tioning systems. The urban poor spent 65 percent of their total budget on food. The
bottom 20 percent, in terms of per capita expenditure, tend to be deficient in food
energy even in normal years such as 1979, when a food-expenditure survey was
made in urban Khartoum (Pinstrup-Andersen et al. 1983). The price elasticity of
cereals and bread among these poor sections of the urban population ranges from
about -0.7 to -0.8, that is, a 1.0 percent increase in price reduces consumption by
0.7 percent. Households in upper-income groups respond much less to price
changes for staple foods. Their price elasticity for cereals was estimated at -0.29
and for bread at -0.22 (Table 53).
A drastic decline in food availability in rural areas and the related movements
of people into urban areas have probably led to a major decline in real wages and
employment for those who were already urban residents and dependent on employ-
ment in service jobs at the lowest income brackets. This is to say that the food
production crisis has probably been transmitted into urban areas not only via its
widespread price effects but also through its effects on urban labor markets.
Certainly the massive influx of drought victims into the urban and peri-urban areas
should have contributed to increased inequality of income in the 1980s.
Nutritional Situation after the 1984-85 Famine
The 1984-85 famine ended with the coming of a good crop year in 1985.
Improved food-aid distribution partly alleviated the situation in western Sudan in















































94Figure 13— Seasonal cereal-livestock terms of trade and child malnutrition,
January 1981-December 1986
Terms of Trade
(Gedaref sorghum to Nyala cattle)
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Sources: Computed from price series data compiled from Sudan, Ministry of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, Agricultural Prices in Sudan: A Historical Review and Analysis, 1970-1984 (Khartoum:
MANR, 1985); Agricultural Situation and Outlook, Annual Report, 1984/85 (Khartoum: MANR,
1985); Agricultural Situation and Outlook, Annual Report, 1986/87 (Khartoum: MANR, 1987);
Sudan, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, Sudan Emergency and Recovery Information
and Surveillance System (SERISS) data tapes, 1986 and 1987.
Sudan's 1986-87 nutritional status survey (the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa)
provides a data base to pursue this question.
7 It is used here to describe the pattern
and causes of child malnutrition.
The October/November 1986 survey results show that 35 percent of children
under five years of age were stunted (height-for-age), 42 percent were underweight
(weight-for-age), and 16 percent were wasted (weight-for-height), using less than
-2 standard deviations of Z-scores for respective measures (Table 59 and Figure
14). The seasonality effect was much stronger for the short-term indicator (weight-
for-height), where the after-harvest, food-rich situation improved the nutritional
situation in January/March 1987.
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96Figure 14—Relative distribution of sample children, by type and level of
anthropometric status indicator, Sudan, 1986
Height-for-Age Z-Scores
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97The prevalence of malnutrition was higher in rural areas, particularly among
the nomads, but the levels were also high for urban areas. Large regional variations
were also observed. The worst areas were Red Sea, Kassala, and Gezira Provinces.
Clearly, the country had a persistent food-security problem with significant vari-
ations across locations (urban/rural), provinces, and seasons (see also Maxwell
1989). Urban areas themselves are not free of sizable seasonality effects (see
weight-for-height, Table 59).
Causes of Malnutrition
The large regional coverage of the Sudan Emergency and Recovery Informa-
tion and Surveillance System (SERISS) surveys of children (Sudan, Ministry of
Health and Social Welfare 1986b and 1987) and the presence of community-related
variables allow some unique analysis. Community-level data are available only for
the round 3 (January/March 1987) and round 4 (May/July 1987) surveys. These two
rounds are used in this study, pooling about 30,000 children for a two-stage
regression analysis. The model explaining the nutritional status of preschool chil-
dren (weight-for-age) comprises the following exogenous variables:
• child demographics (SEX, KIDAGE, KIDAGESQ);
• household demographics (SIZE, SIZESQ, TOTKIDS);
• parents' sociodemographics, including human capital (MOTHAGE, MAOCCUP,
MOTHLT, FATHLT);
• household food-consumption level (LGRPRE);
• meal frequency (MEALLT3);
• child health, short term (DIARPRE); and
• community health environment (INFECT, HLTHSERV).
To account for endogeneity of food consumption (LGRPRE) and short-term
health status (DIARPRE), both of these critical variables are instrumentalized.
Variables related to price, agricultural technology, and community income enter
the instrumentalization of the consumption variable. Particular attention is given to
including availability of piped water in villages and prevalence of irrigated agricul-
ture as variables for diarrhea prediction.
The main hypotheses underlying the model specification are that
• improved household (parents) human capital improves nutrition (MOTHLT,
FATHLT);
• higher levels of food consumption per capita and higher meal frequency in
the household improve nutrition (LGRPRE, MEALLT3);
• children who currently have diarrhea (DIARPRE) are worse off, especially in
the short term, but also in the long term to the extent that current diarrhea is
a symptom of a persistent problem;
• a poor health environment and limited access to health services contribute to
a worse nutritional situation (INFECT, HLTHSERV); and
• an improved piped-water supply improves nutrition via reduced diarrhea
(PIPEWTR).
Regression estimates for nutritional status indicators are used to test these
hypotheses, conditional on a set of child and household demographic charac-
teristics. In addition, there are tests for seasonality (ROUND3) and effects of
residence in predominantly mechanized (MECHY) or irrigated (IRRGY) areas,
98compared with traditional rainfed agriculture entered through the instrumentaliza-
tion of the health and food consumption variables (see list of variables in Table 60).
The results largely substantiate these hypotheses and give additional interest-
ing insights (Tables 61 and 62). The following are the highlights of the findings:
1. Parents' education, especially mother's education in the long term, has a
positive impact on child nutrition. In fact, mother's literacy increases child nutri-
tion, holding other things constant, by more than twice as much as father's literacy.
2. The direct effect of household per capita cereal consumption on children's
nutrition is small but statistically highly significant. But in a period of famine when
there is a large reduction in the consumption level, the impact could be sizable.
Millet price plays an important role in grain consumption (Table 61) and thus
affects child nutrition in the expected way.
3. A large marginal effect is shown by the meal frequency variable, which
separates households that had less than three meals a day at the time of the survey.
This can be viewed as an indicator of severe absolute poverty. Fourteen percent of
these children from such households in the sample who registered, holding other
things constant, were one-quarter Z-score below the others.

































Sex (male = 1)
Age of child in months
Age of child squared
Child birth certificate (yes = 1)
Mother's age in years




Number of children under five years
Log of grain consumption per capita
Less than three meals per day (1 if true)
Mother's literacy (yes = 1)
ather's literacy (yes =1)
Diarrhea at present (yes =1)
Prevalence of infectious diseases (scaled 0-5)
Distance to health center or hospital (scaled 1-4)
Piped water availability (yes =1)
Community participation (yes - 1)
Mechanized rainfed agriculture area (yes = 1)
Mechanized irrigated agriculture area (yes =1)
Season representative survey round 3
(1 if January-March 1987)
Number of immigrants
Number of ex-migrants
























































































Mother's marital status (1 if married)
Village average price of dura
Mechanized irrgated agriculture area (yes =1)
Number of immigrants
Mechanized rainfed agriculture area (yes =1)
Mother's literacy (yes =1)
Community participation (yes = 1)
Dependency ratio














































Mother's literacy (yes = 1)
Mother's marital status (1 if married)
Number of immigrants
Mechanized irrigated agriculture area (yes =1)
Piped-water availability (yes =1)



















4. Besides the food-shortage indicator of less than three meals a day, the
diarrhea variable is the most powerful for child nutrition. Piped water reduces
diarrhea substantially, but irrigation was not found to increase it (Table 63).
5. A better community health and sanitation environment would make a differ-
ence for child nutritional status, as indicated by the piped water working through
reduced diarrhea to reduce malnutrition. A closer health service facility also con-
tributes to improved nutritional status.
6. The agricultural production environment does not have a significant impact
on the nutritional indicator directly. However, households' food consumption
worsens in both mechanized rainfed and irrigated agricultural environments, and
this does translate into a worse nutritional outcome (see Table 61).

























Sex (male = 1)
Less than three meals per day ( 1 if true)
Season representative survey round 3
(1 if January-March 1987)
Mother's age in years
Mother's occupation
Prevalence of infectious diseases (scaled 0-5)
Age of child squared
Household size squared
Child birth certificate (yes = 1)
Distance to health center or hospital (scaled 1-4)
Father's literacy (yes = 1)
Mother's literacy (yes = 1)
Predicted LNGRCAP
Household size







































Note: The consumption and health variables are predicted.
Important policy conclusions emerge from these findings: (1) The acute food
shortage problem remains a major concern in a significant proportion of house-
holds. Even in a good year, as in 1986/87, the hunger problem was widespread and
the relationship to child nutrition was strong. Creation of effective demand through
employment creation and a host of measures to generate and transfer purchasing
power to the poor is necessary; (2) improvement in community health and sanita-
tion environment goes a long way toward nutritional improvement. The short-term
diarrhea problem needs to be addressed in this context; and (3) rapid improvement
in human capital, especially formal education, promises high returns in nutritional
improvement through both the productivity and income effects.
Public action is called for in all three of these areas. Although the effects are
partly long term, this action needs more urgent attention now, since household-
response capabilities have been exhausted and community services eroded by the
famines of the 1980s.
101PAST POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
FOR COPING WITH DROUGHT AND FAMINE
Sudan's experience in the 1980s has demonstrated the strong link between
drought and famine in an environment where the agricultural resource base is poor,
asset and income levels are low and variable, and public preparedness is lacking.
The absence of public policy and institutional capacity to predict, prepare, and
intervene was notable in view of the country's long history of drought-related
famines and its past record of successful application of legislated famine preven-
tion policy (famine codes). The lessons of 1984-85 appear to center on the public
realization of the need to improve the production and income base of the rural
population; to moderate fluctuations of production, prices, and income; and to
establish a permanent institution to deal with relief and rehabilitation. This study
underlines the key policy choices and views development, relief, and rehabilitation
as integral components of a broad framework of famine prevention and prepared-
ness.
It is argued in this study that famine events in Sudan are very much the result
of short-term policy failures and market imperfections arising in a difficult-to-man-
age agroclimatic environment, fostered by deficiencies in long-run economic
strategies. As was argued at the outset, the drought-famine relationships need to be
assessed in a broader economic-policy context. The short-term crisis events are to
a large extent the result of long-term policy failures, especially those related to
agriculture. Therefore, this chapter first presents an overview of the long-term
policy environment. Next, attention is drawn to relief policies for famine preven-
tion in Sudan earlier in this century. The conclusion of the analysis is that it is
largely policy failure that makes drought the triggering factor for famines. Dealing
with drought, however, poses a major challenge to policy.
Economic Plans and Programs
without a Strategy
Following independence in 1956, Sudan continued its policy of promoting
production for export in the high potential riverine lands of central Sudan. Irrigated
agriculture continued to be organized along the structure set in the Gezira scheme
in 1925, where the sole priority was cotton production. This approach continued
with the nation's first Economic and Social Development Plan, which came into
effect in 1961/62 for a period of 10 years (see Wohlmuth 1987 and D'Silva 1985
for a review).
Parallel to the expansion of irrigated agriculture, there was spontaneous growth
in private mechanized farming in the dryland of Eastern and Central regions. The
102government established the Mechanized Farming Corporation in 1968 to stream-
line, regulate, and provide support for expansion of mechanized agriculture. Large-
scale privately financed mechanized farming was considered an important and
quick means of promoting agricultural production in a country where land was
assumed to be abundant (Elhassan 1988).
The subsequent plan, which was set for a five-year period (1970/71-1974/75),
continued the emphasis on irrigated and mechanized agriculture to accelerate cash-
and food-crop production in high-potential areas. Agricultural policy took a more
aggressive turn in 1973, when the government introduced an interim action pro-
gram that modified the original plan. With high prospects and commitments for
large inflows of capital from Arab countries that prospered from the oil boom of the
mid-1970s, and with Sudan's assumed great potential to produce an exportable
surplus to meet its food import needs, the government embarked on a drive—the
"breadbasket strategy"—to promote agricultural production and agro-industrial
products. Development expenditures allocated to these projects greatly increased
from SD£42 million to SD£102 million in the single year between 1973/74 and
1974/75. Nearly two-thirds of the expenditures were foreign-financed, largely from
Arab funds.
The drive for the breadbasket strategy got a further push in the following
Six-Year Plan (1977/78-1982/83), when the desire to attain self-sufficiency in
selected food crops, particularly in wheat and sorghum, was articulated. The
government's Food Investment Strategy of 1977 set this goal and called for the
infusion of large-scale private capital into mechanized farming. In addition, the
Six-Year Plan aimed at enhancing the speed and capacity of the agricultural sector
to increase production and expand the export base to meet food demands in the
Arab world. The Arab Fund's Basic Program for Agricultural Development for
1976-1985 provided the basis for the evolution of the production structure. The
program's goal was to make Sudan a major exporter of sugar, wheat, oilseed, meat,
fruits, and vegetables (Adams and Ho well 1979).
An important departure of the Six-Year Plan, compared with its predecessors,
was its recognition of the importance of traditional smallholder agriculture and the
call for a parallel development strategy that would continue development of irri-
gated and mechanized agriculture and stimulate traditional crop and livestock
production. In practice, however, the process meant an infusion of projects to
mechanize traditional agriculture and establishment of modern ranches and large
agricultural cooperatives (Adams and Howell 1979). The policy, in effect, resulted
in mechanization of some selected high-potential areas.
The Six-Year Plan was abandoned a year after its inception as the country's
economic crisis deepened and its planned growth got off track and was unsustained.
Economic growth, which registered rapid rates of increase in the mid-1970s, started
to taper off in 1977. The economy declined at an annual rate of -1.6 percent in
1977, followed by -10.4 percent in 1978 (Table 64). The substantial inflow of
capital from Arab countries peaked in 1974/75 and tapered off in the second half of
the 1970s.
The government, constrained by low public savings, turned to borrowing from
the Central Bank to finance its mounting deficits. Central Bank financing of the
overall public deficit reached 97 percent in 1977/78. The growth rate of money
supply surged from 19 percent in 1974/75 to 31 percent in 1978/79. The average
103Table 64—Macroeconomic indicators for selected years, Sudan
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Sources: World Bank, Sudan: Prospects for Rehabilitation of the Sudanese Economy, vols. 1, 2, and 3
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1985); World Bank, Sudan: Problems of Economic Adjustment,
vols. 1, 2, and 3 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1987); and Bank of Sudan, Annual Report
(Khartoum: Bank of Sudan, 1980-86).
Note: n.a. means not available.
aGDP refers to real gross domestic product in 1981/82 prices.
Based on simple average of cost-of-living indices for low- and high-income groups.
'Nominal exchange rate adjusted for different inflation rates between Sudan and the United States.
inflation rate rose from 23 percent to 32 percent over the same period, partly
because of an easy monetary policy. Moreover, the economy failed to meet the
excess demand that was partly fueled by the expansionary investment program and
the lag in the supply response of new projects. Increases in petroleum and petro-
leum products prices also contributed to the increase in the general price level. The
sluggish export performance, particularly of cotton, in the 1970s, coupled with
rising import bills, precipitated large deficits in the trade balance. The nation's
capacity to service its external debt obligations shrank in the face of its worsening
capacity to raise foreign exchange either through trade or capital inflows. In the late
1970s the mounting disequilibria in both internal and external balances obliged the
government to enter into a stabilization and adjustment program designed by the
International Monetary Fund/International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment.
This program, which started primarily as a stabilization scheme in 1978,
expanded into a comprehensive Economic Recovery Program in 1980. The pro-
gram goals were to accelerate agricultural production, especially export and im-
port-substituting crops, close the budget deficits, cut the rising inflation rate, and
improve the capacity to earn the foreign exchange to repay the mounting external
public debts. A combination of fiscal, monetary, exchange-rate, price, trade-liber-
alization, and institutional-reform policies was instituted. The fiscal policy com-
prised measures to cut as well as to reprioritize government spending and to
enhance revenue generation. Monetary measures involved setting targets for credit
and money supply and limits to public borrowing as well as alignment of nominal
104interest rates with rising price levels. The exchange rates were set to be devalued
and unified to encourage growth of tradable production sectors, especially those
involved in the production of export commodities. Other policy measures included
deregulation of prices and liberalization of trade to create an economic environ-
ment conducive to greater participation by the private sector. The government
pursued these policies within the framework of a rolling three-year public-invest-
ment program.
An Agriculture Rehabilitation Program was integrated as a component of the
economic recovery program. It placed a heavy emphasis on the country's capacity
to generate foreign earnings through the export of cotton. This was to be achieved
through the completion of ongoing viable projects, rehabilitation of existing pro-
duction capacity, and improvement of the incentive and income-sharing arrange-
ments of cotton producers in the irrigated schemes. The prime target was the
irrigated subsector, which was assumed to yield quick economic returns. However,
the program noted the high potential of the rainfed-agriculture sector to stimulate
the economy and called for devising a strategy for the development of this sector.
The recovery program continued for seven years until 1985, when it was
suspended by a new military government. It was replaced by the annual develop-
ment plan for 1985. The abandonment of the recovery program was related to its
failure to ameliorate the worsening economic situation of the country, which was
accelerated by drought in 1984. Macroeconomic indicators for 1984/85, for in-
stance, show that real GDP fell 14.4 percent, and the public deficit registered as 16
percent of GDP. The annual inflation rate reached 46 percent and thus contributed
to an appreciation of the real exchange rate—changes in the nominal exchange rate
did not translate into real devaluation, at least in 1984/85. The macroeconomic
development and failure to implement comprehensive reform—including moving
to a market-oriented exchange rate—have been identified as major underlying
causes of the increased famine vulnerability of the Sudanese economy (Atabani
1991).
Views differ on the factors that contributed to the ineffectiveness of the recov-
ery program (see Brown 1986 for a review). The donor community associates the
poor performance with shifts in government priorities and adherence to partial
programs and piecemeal measures. Such government behavior might have resulted
from the debilitating effects of three years of continuous droughts, the so-called
Islamization program (which included abolition of income taxes and interest rate
charges), the war in the south, and concern for the political repercussions of some
of the measures. Advocates of the more structural approach consider the policy
package of the recovery program to have been irrelevant or insufficient to solve the
deep economic crisis.
The civilian government that came to power in 1986 introduced the Four-Year
Economic Salvation, Recovery, and Development Program, which, like previous
economic development efforts, had the broad objective of achieving sustained
economic growth and effectively boosting real per capita GDP. The agricultural
sector's role was considered to be of prime importance—increased agricultural
production would spearhead the growth process. The program also incorporated
goals of income and wealth redistribution and food security for rural and urban
populations. In contrast to the previous economic development plans, the 1986
program, drawn in the aftermath of the country's bitter experience with the 1984-85
105famine that revealed its vulnerability, recognized the need not only for adequate
food production but also for an operationally efficient food-distribution system.
Economic Deterioration and War
Successive governments have relied heavily on partial solutions and economy-
wide controls to suppress excess aggregate demand. More important, the food and
agricultural policies pursued in Sudan so far have concentrated on the irrigated
agriculture subsector and large-scale mechanized farming to the neglect of tradi-
tional, smallholder agriculture.
This is all against the background of continued conflict and war. The country
has been engaged in a protracted war since 1955, though there was a 10-year spell
of peace from 1972 to 1983. As a result of the war, millions of rural people have
been displaced and forced to migrate, leaving their homes and changing from
producers to net receivers of food relief. Production has been disrupted and em-
ployment opportunities have diminished (there is no war machinery creating a
short-term war boom).
Relief Policies and Responses
Sudanese records show that the country has a long history of recurrent famines.
Except for the period between 1920 and 1956, public response to prevent and
contain famines has been nonexistent. The rural population has had to depend
largely on their own resources and coping strategies. Such capabilities, however,
have been threatened in recent years, particularly in the aftermath of the 1984-85
famine, because of greatly reduced asset bases of the rural population and increased
volatility of employment, income, and food prices in rural areas. Medium- and
long-term programs aimed at durable solutions need to be initiated to reverse the
present trends, stabilize the population of the affected areas, and create sustainable
environments. Accordingly, a new approach is needed; yet, some lessons from
Sudan's own past experience are worthy of remembrance.
Colonial Famine Policy
The colonial famine policy in Sudan was much influenced by the British
experience gained in India. In India, detailed famine legislation had been drawn up
during the second quarter of the last century. These famine codes focused on earlier
identification of the risks of famine, the provision of employment and public work
schemes for those who can work, and food distribution to those unable to work
(Dreze 1988).
The British administration in Sudan induced the establishment of a similar
approach to famine policies. National famine regulations were actually drawn up
after the First World War (1920) and guided government actions in cases of famine
during the next three decades (Shepherd 1988). The regulations embodied three
cardinal guiding principles: the government should respond promptly to provide
relief to those in need; relief should be in the form of provision of employment to
those able to work; and free food should be distributed to those unable to work.
106The 1920 famine codes outlined the process of discovery, preparedness, and
intervention in times of threat or actual famine. The components of governmental
reaction to famine are very similar to today's components of a disaster relief policy.
The main components were (1) discovery of threat of famine through a system of
intelligence gathering including personal inspection; (2) preliminary measures of
preparation, which included, among others, validation of information, selection of
programs and sites for relief work, and tests to see if there was actual famine. The
tests involved provision of public works at low wages and under hard conditions;
(3) immediate implementation of a relief program, as soon as the existence of
famine was declared, that included the provision of work for the able-bodied and
free food for those unable to work; and (4) detailed inspection of relief work and
assessment of the effectiveness of the relief program.
The famine regulations, which were in effect between 1920 and 1956, were
instrumental in preventing major famines. They were applied "almost fifty times in
different areas of Sudan" during this period (Pearson 1986). Actions taken to
prevent famine became routine features of famine administration (Shepherd 1988).
Food Aid and Relief Management, 1984-88
Between the mid-1950s and early 1980s, there were no special institutions that
handled antifamine work. Even though no major food crisis developed in these
years, the Sahel drought of 1968-73 had a localized impact, particularly in the west.
Because of the abandonment of the earlier relief regulations without substitution of
a viable national policy to prevent famine, the rural population had to resort to their
traditional coping mechanisms. The government's failure to maintain and further
improve the earlier famine-prevention policies proved very burdensome for the
rural population. The droughts of 1982-84 and the great famine of 1984-85 re-
vealed the limits to the ability of the rural population to subsist on its own.
The onset of the 1984-85 famine was noted as early as 1983. People moved on
a permanent basis from the drier areas of Northern Kordofan and Northern Darfur
in 1983. The governors of the western and eastern provinces appealed to the central
government in late 1983 and early 1984 to provide relief support. The government
response was slow and ad hoc (banning of sorghum exports in March 1984,
increase of area under sorghum cultivation in the irrigated areas, and shipment of
5,400 tons of sorghum to the west in April/May). The lack of sufficient response
from the central government prompted the governor of Darfur to resign in April
1984. Except for some sorghum that reached western Sudan in late 1984, relief
activity gathered momentum and peaked in May/June 1985—several months after
the appeal by the governors for emergency support.
There were three principal waves of food aid to western Sudan in the 1980s in
response to major crop and income failures. The first and major food-aid flow was
initiated in 1984-86. Another crop failure was experienced in 1987, prompting a
second relief flow in 1988. The good crop year of 1988 was followed by two
consecutive years of bad harvests, which called for a third wave of food aid.
Kordofan received a total of 331,300 tons of cereal food aid in the 1984-86
period (Table 65). The flow of food aid dropped to 32,100 tons in 1986/87 but
recovered to about 72,000 tons in 1988.
A series of administrative committees were established in Kordofan by the end
of 1984. A high-level policymaking relief committee was established in August






























Source: Based on data from the Regional Food Aid Administration Office, El Obeid.
1984. It was responsible for setting up plans, strategies, and policies to mobilize
resources and to guide and supervise relief work. Technical committees were set up
at the regional and local levels to implement the 1984/85 relief operation. An office
of Regional Food Aid Administration (RFAA) was created in August 1984 to
administer food aid in collaboration with the technical committees.
The donor community took a leading role in relief operations in 1985/86. The
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, which had been created in mid-1985 (see
Appendix), was not yet in a position to provide effective institutional support. Food
delivery was undertaken largely by donors with assistance from foreign nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs). In Kordofan, the NGOs operated within specific
zones under the umbrella of RFAA and the technical committees. For example,
CARE operated in Sodari, Bara, En Nahud, and El Obeid districts, Save the
Children Fund/USA in Um Ruwaba district, and Sudan Aid in northern En Nahud.
This parallel structure was abandoned at the end of the 1984-86 relief opera-
tion. The RFAA office in Kordofan took responsibility for the distribution and
management of relief work in 1988 (Buchanan-Smith 1990). The local technical
committees were used as vehicles for delivery of relief food to the recipients. The
donors monitored and supervised the relief work through a privately contracted
firm.
Intraregional relief food allocation was largely based on assessment of area
specific needs. For 1984/85, districts in Kordofan were ranked according to crop
production record, scale of out-migration, anthropometric measures of nutritional
status, and reported mortality rates. The RFAA office adopted 450 grams per
person as a minimum full quota per day. Varying fractions of the full quota were
then applied to the districts to reflect these rankings. A maximum allocation per
family was set, based on the assumption that no family had more than six members.
For 1985/86 and 1986/87, the concept of a subsistence gap was applied as a
measure of need. Districts were ranked according to the estimated percentage of the
subsistence gap. Rural councils within specific districts were allocated a variation
of the district-specific quota in accordance with their rankings. To determine its
relief needs for 1987/88, Kordofan was divided into three crop-risk zones. Risk was
108defined in terms of the extent of expected crop failure. The full quota was then
assigned to areas in the complete crop-failure zone. In effect, the methodology of
food assessment in 1988 regressed as compared with the food-balance approach
adopted in 1986 and 1987.
At the household level, allocation within specific target areas was based on the
principle of equal distribution. That is, resident families within specific food-target
areas were equally eligible for distribution. Priority was accorded to all who stayed
in their place of residence during the operation, including those in towns. Except
for a small share of the quota that was monetized, food was largely distributed free.
Food aid reached a high percentage of the rural population in the 1984-86
operation, but there were notable deficiencies. Food aid arrived at the villages at
different points in time. In some of these villages the severity of the food shortage
reached its peak in the months preceding the arrival of food aid (Table 66). When
the waiting period was too long, a village would move en masse in search of work
and relief. The poor timeliness was partly related to the fact that food allocated to
the region was not delivered on schedule.
Food aid that was actually delivered was often much less than the planned,
area-specific ration (Table 67). Two important factors explain such below-target
delivery. First, food allocated to the region was not sufficient to meet the planned
distribution. Second, there were considerable losses due to wastage and leakage.
For example, combining the lower-than-target allocation and underweight factors,
the total sorghum available for the May-October 1985 allocation was sufficient
only for a 3.3-month allocation.
The original allocation plan of "equal per capita" was not observed. For
example, there were significant intervillage variations in actual per capita distribu-
tion within the same district (Table 66). These variations were related to irregulari-
ties in the timing and frequency of food-aid flows across villages. In addition, there
Table 66—Relief food arrival time, amount distributed, and frequency in



























































Source: International Food Policy Research Institute survey, 1989.

















Table 67—Food aid targeted and received in districts of Northern Kordofan,
May-October 1985
Percent
Target Amount of Target






Sources: OXFAM-UNICEF and Kordofan Regional Government, "A Report on the Nutritional Status of
1,888 Children in Kordofan, February/March 1985"; "The Nutritional Status of Children in
Kordofan, May/June 1985"; "The Nutritional Status of 4,575 Children in Kordofan Region,
September/October, 1985"; and "The Nutritional Status of 3,183 Children in Kordofan Region,
March 1986" (mimeographed).
was less adherence to the application of a uniform quota—the premium (such as
malnutrition or migration) of getting food aid was much higher for the remote
villages.
No household-specific data exist on distribution of relief food within villages.
Recall-based information indicates sizable intravillage variations, although fami-
lies were supposed to share equally. Part of the problem can be ascribed to the
design of the food-aid policy. The food ration per family was based on two key
assumptions—equal weight for every member in terms of food requirement and a
maximum family size of six members. The ration per family thus had an inherent
bias against large families, particularly those with a high proportion of adult
members. Furthermore, the application of universal eligibility (except the nonresi-
dents) fails to recognize food aid as one of several coping instruments. Families are
unequal in terms of their coping capacity.
It is probably valid to argue that the relief policy was less favorable to the poor.
The original plan to extend relief only to those who had no resources failed for lack
of sufficient information and political sensitivity. The residence requirement for
eligibility must have significantly excluded the poor from the distribution. Most of
those who migrated earlier were probably among the poor. The two-tier distribution
modality (free distribution and cash payment at a subsidized price) was also
unfavorable to the poor. In the absence of a program to augment their income, the
poor could not effectively participate in the monetization scheme.
Building Coping Capacity: Selected Project Experiences
The year 1985 witnessed a large-scale famine relief operation in western
Sudan. By 1986, the regional government of Kordofan had developed a rehabilita-
tion strategy based on the concept of a zonal framework (KRMFEP 1986). The
region was divided into three zones (northern, transitional, and southern), then
110subdivided into six zones. The zones were designed to show low intrazone but high
interzone variability in their ecological features, potential agricultural base, and
population settlement.
The plan identified strategies applicable to all as well as to specific zones. The
primary goals were to restore the degraded natural environment through rehabilita-
tion of forest and natural pasture, to improve availability and distribution of rural
water supply, to promote agricultural production and income, and to provide
support for households targeted for resettlement or reconstitution of their asset
base. The relative emphasis of these goals varied across zones.
A sample of ongoing rehabilitation projects in the region is shown in Table 68.
They show considerable comparability to the priorities set for the region. The
projects cover rehabilitation of land and water (such as restocking of gum arabic
Table 68—Sample of ongoing rehabilitation activities in Northern Kordofan,
1988/89
Intervention Program
Smallholder credit for cash-
crop production
Restocking of gum arabic
trees and other forestry
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Villages selected on the basis
of high production potental;
membership open to farmers
with access to land and proven
repayment capacity
Villages with low acacia sen-
gal tree coverage are selected.
Open to farm families who
own land, work on farm, and
reside in the villages
Low-income women with no
livestock
Nomadic families with no





aABS = Agricultural Bank of Sudan; USAID = United States Agency for International Development; SCF
= Save the Children Federation; IFAD = International Fund for Agricultural Development; UNSO =
United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office; WFP = World Food Programme; UNDP «• United Nations Devel-
opment Programme; UNICEF = United Nations Children's Fund; OXFAM = Oxford Committee for Fam-
ine Relief.
bCARE/Canada in En Nahud district, SCF/US in Um Ruwaba, UNICEF in Bara and El Obeid, and ILO
(International Labor Organization) in Bara operate small-scale forestry projects.
CUNICEF also undertakes other projects such as poultry, mechanized farming, composting, seeds, beekeep-
ing, handicrafts, adult education, and village water supplies throughout Kordofan Region.
Illtrees), asset reconstitution (such as restocking of goats), and promotion of agricul-
tural production (for example, through provision of production credit).
These microprojects are not expected to reverse the process that has rendered
the rural economy vulnerable to a recurrence of famine. But they are likely to
facilitate and contribute to the establishment and protection of the coping capacity
of the famine-prone population. Selected cases of such intervention programs are
examined here to learn from their experiences and to draw lessons that should be
incorporated in devising a strategy for famine prevention in the drought-prone
areas. The case of the Jebel Marra Rural Development Project in Darfur is added to
the review of Kordofan-based projects. It highlights the importance of technologi-
cal change in agriculture as a source of growth and an income buffer in time of
crisis.
Food-for-Work Planting: The Gum Belt Project
The gum belt of Kordofan stretches from west to east within the Sahelian zone
and contributes nearly 50 percent of the world's production of gum arabic. Typi-
cally, farmers in the gum belt maintain gum gardens as part of their traditional
agroforestry practices. The gum trees, acacia Senegal (Jiashab) in particular, play a
central role in maintaining the agro-ecological balance in the otherwise delicate
and fragile ecological zone. In addition, the trees provide direct income to the farm
population.
Gum production steadily declined in the 1980s, reaching its lowest point in
1984 (Table 69). A continuous aridity in the 1970s and 1980s, unfavorable official
producer prices, and the frequent dependence of the rural population on income
from tree products (charcoal and firewood) as a fallback in times of crop failure
contributed to a combined outcome of decline in tree density and productivity.
There is now marked evidence that the gum belt is shrinking, at least on its northern
frontier.
The areas that require the greatest tree coverage are the most exposed to
desertification. Such recognition has prompted various levels of response for reha-
bilitating the gum belt, especially since the 1984 drought. A joint United Nations
Development Program and Government of Sudan project began in 1981 to rehabili-
tate the Kordofan gum belt. The primary goal of the project is to halt degeneration
of the environment, but it has secondary goals of creating additional employment
and improving the income position of participating farmers.



















64The framework for implementation of the Gum Arabic Restocking Project is
based on central nurseries that serve satellite villages in their designated areas.
Nurseries are selected on the basis of proximity to a permanent water source, road
accessibility, and density of settlement. Each nursery serves a selected number of
villages. Farm households are selected from participating villages. Village commit-
tees serve as the entry point for participating farmers.
The central nurseries produce and multiply seedlings, and the project delivers
the seedlings. In addition, it sells water at a subsidized rate to water-deficit villages
and delivers food rations. By mid-1989, the project had covered about 12,000
farmers in nearly 300 villages (Table 70). In the first three years, the project
covered on average 27 villages per year at a rate of 29 farmers per village. There
was a jump in the rate of coverage in 1984 and 1985, mainly in the average number
of villages. Since 1985 there has been an increasing demand for expansion of
enrollment. The integration of food aid into the project package, the realization of
improved prospects for better gum prices, and increasing awareness of the project's
desire to revitalize the environment are presumed to contribute to this surge in
demand. The project management has shown some flexibility in its rules, at least in
raising the quantitative quota per village since 1986. But, because of resource
limits, the management exercises administrative rationing to restrict enrollment.
Project reports indicate that effective tree coverage due to the project averages
141 trees per feddan (338 trees per hectare). This amounts to about 57 percent of
the recommended planting rate. Findings in IFPRI survey villages concur with the
observed rate of low survival. On average, the low-density villages in Table 71 in
fact show a much lower survival rate. In addition, data from El Obeid and Bara
villages show emerging patterns. First, there are considerable variations in gum
output per farm across villages due to variability in tree density, age specificity of
tree productivity, and fractions of trees tapped and harvested. Second, project fields
have a relatively high tree density compared with traditional hashab fields. Third,
the short-term employment effect of the project appears to be modest. Fourth, the
food ration is the only source of variation between the income sources of partici-
pants and nonparticipants. A low income share from gum production is largely






















































Source: Based on data from the Department of Forestry, El Obeid.
113Table 71—Density, farm size, and yield for low- and high-density farms in































Source: International Food Policy Research Institute survey, 1989.
Note: n.a. means not available.
aMean yield of a young tree under the project.
bYield varies by age of tree; it is low in early years (6-8), peaks in middle age (9-12), and drops in later years
(13-18). No consensus has been established as to whether the yield in old age is higher or lower than when
young, even though most tend to suggest the older trees yield better.
cOn average, 50-60 percent of trees are tapped every year.
expected, given that the trees take six to eight years to mature and most of the
villages were not ready to tap in 1988. The benefits of the project are of course
larger in the long run as trees move into their peak productive age cycle and other
crops benefit from improved soil fertility and moisture.
At the project level, the management should adhere to the primary goal of
pursuing a wide coverage of area through promotion of a minimum recommended
planting rate. In the short run, given the scale of the project, one option for
broadening the scope of participation is to modify the modality of the project
operation. It can, for example, focus on a "model farmer" approach, where groups
are formed around model farmers, seedlings are provided to groups on a rotating
"credit" basis, and the actual allocation is conditional on the groups' performance.
In addition, it is necessary to modify the current incentive structure to allow linkage
of payments to task measures of output. Food must be linked to the task rate and
limited to the preproduction phase.
Improved Agricultural Technology
Compared with the rest of Darfur, Jebel Marra and its surroundings represent
an area of high agricultural potential. The area benefits from a long-term rural
development project that has a component of agricultural-technology promotion.
The extension of this technology has enhanced the production as well as the
employment-absorption capacity of the Jebel Marra area in recent years.
8
8This section draws on the work of Graciela Wiegand-Jahn (1989). The research was a cooperative
effort between IFPRI and the Jebel Marra Rural Development Project. All results presented in this
section are derived from data sets provided by the Monitoring and Evaluation Department of the
project.
114In the early 1980s, the area experienced lower than usual rainfall. In 1984, as
in much of western Sudan, the lack of rain was severe;. The area had to cope not
only with food shortages for its own population but also had to absorb a large
number of refugees who came from areas that were even more affected (other parts
of Darfur and Chad).
The drought of 1984, which led to a total crop failure in many parts of Northern
Darfur, led to reduced production in the Jebel Marra project area. All villages in the
project area experienced a drop in grain production, but villages that had access to
modern inputs through extension services experienced smaller declines (Table 72).
Within the participating villages, households with access to improved inputs and
extension services achieved a higher grain output per capita and managed to
produce enough to meet calorie needs.
A comparison of the participating and nonparticipating households shows that
only a few households in the participating group had no male head in the drought
year, while 50 percent of the nonparticipating households had to manage the
drought year without a male head of household (Table 73). The relatively small
fluctuation in household size and in percentage of female-headed households in the
participating group over the years suggests that these households were in a much
more stable position during the crisis year of 1984/85 than the nonparticipating
households. Those without access to modern inputs produced less and had to
manage by adjusting household size through out-migration of adult males. Coping
was much easier for those participating in the project.
Typically, farmers from Northern Darfur come to the project area during the
harvest period in search of employment. In 1984, a large number of refugees came
to the area from places that were severely affected by the drought (Northern Darfur
Table 72—Grain production before, during, and after the 1984 drought, by
participation in the Jebel Marra Project
Grain Production per Household
Participating Villages
Participating Nonparticipating Participating Nonparticipating


































Source: Computed on the basis of Jebel Marra survey data.
Note: The village of Taij was excluded because of unusually high yields.
"The mean of the participating and nonparticipating groups was significantly different (t-test).
The mean was statistically lower than in previous years (t-test).
cPer capita grain production in the 1984/85 season was 178 kilograms for participants and 75 kilograms for
nonparticipants. There was no significant difference within participating villages. The same pattern appears
when the comparisons are made on the basis of proportion of households with less than 1,000 calories per
capita per day. The percentage was higher in nonparticipating villages (79) as compared with participating
villages (41).
115Table 73—Household size and percentage of female heads of household in





























Source: Computed on the basis of Jebel Marra farm survey data.
and Chad). Most came to the project area in October and November 1984, around
harvest time. Many settled around existing villages in the project area, in the fertile
lower-valley zone that experienced a significantly better grain harvest than other
zones in the drought year (see Table 74).
Improved agricultural technology was thus a powerful tool for mitigating the
drought crisis. Given the mobility of labor in the region, a concentration of techno-
logical change in the comparatively high-potential area provided respite for
drought refugees from a large surrounding area.
Credit for Production and Consumption
The Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) initiated a cooperative-based credit
program in El Obeid district in 1981/82 for production enhancement and consump-
tion stabilization. The program caters primarily to the credit needs of small farmers
in rainfed agriculture. ABS provides targeted loans to finance current production
and storage.





























Source: Computed on the basis of Jebel Marra farm survey data.
Note: The numbers in parentheses represent the number of refugees in percentage of village population.
116Village-based cooperatives that have a legal entity serve as a channel for
delivery of credit and marketing services to small farmers. Each village can form
one cooperative, provided that it has a minimum of 50 members. Membership is
open to resident farmers who are over 18 years of age, and who have access to land
and a sound credit record.
Each borrower is allowed to finance a fixed maximum area per crop. ABS
determines the loan rate per area. The total loan per borrower is a function of the
loan rate per area and the total area approved for financing. Production loans are
disbursed in three installments. This strategy is intended to ensure that the loan is
used for designated operations and to minimize the risk of loan default, ABS
charges an administrative fee on its loaned funds.
ABS has so far reached a maximum of 21 cooperatives covering nearly 2,000
members per season (Table 75). A significant number of cooperatives were regis-
tered in the 1983/84 and 1984/85 seasons, the two drought years, but only a small
fraction of them were financed. Despite an increase in demand for loans, ABS was
unwilling to risk a high loan default rate. This is evident in the drop in the loan rate
per area.
Available evidence of loan utilization shows that a large percentage of ABS
loans are used for food consumption. Studies by the Kordofan Rainfed Agricultural
Project and ABS (Technoserve/ABS/USAID 1987; Bielen, Crauder, and Rivarola
1989) show that 68 and 83 percent of the loans were used for food consumption in
the 1986/87 and 1988/89 seasons, respectively. The IFPRI study shows an average
of 73 percent for the 1988/89 season. No more than 20 percent is used for the
purchase of current agricultural inputs and the cost of labor. Food is thus a top
priority of ABS clients.
Loans are seldom recovered in full on the first due date (Table 75). Exceptions to
this are 1988/89 and the early years. ABS was effective in its early years when loan
size was small; however, high rates of current loan default occurred in the drought years
from 1982/83 to 1984/85. The lowest on record was 1984/85, the peak drought year.
ABS's strict application of debt collection policy (no debt relief, no reschedul-
ing of debts, and no new loans without a settlement of old loans) contributed to a
recovery of its past loans in 1986/87 but drove out a large proportion of borrowers.
Farmers express their reluctance to join ABS for fear of loss of income and assets
in case of crop failure.
The weak performance of ABS in terms of its record of low profitability and an
apparent decline in loan participation has raised serious doubts about its narrowly
focused goal of financing agricultural production in such a highly volatile environ-
ment. There are serious questions to be dealt with. Should ABS broaden its
mandate to contribute to improvement of the underlying conditions that cause
production instability? Should ABS attach greater weight to farmers' expressed
desire for income or investment diversification? Could ABS be used as a source of
alternative financing in times of severe income failure in rural areas? ABS may not
be particularly positioned to respond to these needs, but these are relevant points to
be addressed in the context of drought-prone areas like Northern Kordofan.
Restocking of Livestock
The UNICEF goat-restocking project represents an asset-rehabilitation effort
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118female-headed households in the drier areas of Northern Kordofan, particularly in
El Obeid (Um Esheria) and Bara districts. It was felt that income controlled by
women had the greatest and most effective impact on child nutrition and health, and
children of these households had become the most vulnerable in the postfamine
period.
The project provides two breeding female goats to qualified participants.
Eligibility for participation is conditional on proof of income and wealth status and
written consent to abide by the rules of participation. Such rules include, among
others, agreement to use goat products to feed the participant's children, to pay
back two female offspring within a 24-month period, and to refrain from selling
female goats to ensure growth of stock.
By the end of 1989, a total of 1,521 breeding female goats were distributed to
760 female-headed households, and another 248 goats were distributed to 124
participants from the collection of offspring from the original parent stock. By the
end of 1989 the project had benefited 398 families in 10 villages in Bara district and
486 families in 11 villages in El Obeid (Um Esheria) district.
The IFPRI survey results indicate that participation in the project has apparent
positive economic effects. Although ownership of livestock is generally low,
families in the project appear to have more livestock. Ownership of goats has also
contributed to improvement in income position. In addition, it has improved the
relative income position of the participants. Twenty-seven percent of the project
group belonged to the relatively high income position, compared with 10 percent
of the control group. Such improvements in asset and income position have trans-
lated into higher levels of calorie consumption.
The project is under pressure to expand to meet a growing demand for partici-
pation. Given UNICEF's limited capital budget for the project, its future growth
and sustenance depend on how fast it can promote expansion through progeny
distribution. Crucial to such expansion is the performance of growth indicators,
especially birth and death rates. The survey shows that there are sizable variations
in these growth indicators across villages. The project lacks effective veterinary-
service support to reach the participants. In addition, there are variations in the
degree of monitoring and supervision of growth performance. Where such monitor-
ing is lax, there is a tendency to underreport births, especially in the case of female
offspring, in order to delay repayment. It is thus crucial that growth performance,
monitoring, and supervision improve.
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POLICY CONCLUSIONS
Drought-famine relationships are complex. Therefore, policy recommenda-
tions to deal with them are also complex and closely interlinked. Nevertheless, an
attempt is made here to tie together the major policy conclusions of this study and




The peaceful settlement of the conflict in the South is the most important
element for the economic well-being of the whole country and for the most
vulnerable groups in particular. Not only does the cost of war to human life
continue to be high, but it has also led to the displacement of millions of rural
people, rendering them unproductive and making them prime clients of food relief.
Furthermore, large areas in the savannah belt with adequate rainfall and high
productivity, especially for foodgrains, are becoming increasingly inaccessible
because of the war. This is a lost opportunity for the country to increase its total
grain production and employment for the rural population and hence to reduce its
vulnerability to food insecurity.
Participation of Rural Population
Insofar as policies affect rural areas directly, the stabilization of these areas in
prevailing situations of discontinuity requires the active participation of the rural
population. This participation should be a two-way process: on the one hand,
decentralization of power from the center to local, provincial, and regional levels
is called for, and on the other hand, rural people should form their own rural
institutions that would identify their problems, propose solutions to these prob-
lems, and commit resources toward meeting the costs involved. Adoption of such
policies would probably enhance stability even when the central government
changes. Thus the rural people would have their interests safeguarded despite the
volatility of the political system.
Stable rural institutions are of critical importance during food shortages and
famine crises. If local relief and rehabilitation committees were already in exist-
ence, they could be mobilized quickly and would be of great assistance to the
9The set of conclusions presented here also builds on insights gained from a policy workshop in
Sudan, where the study findings were reviewed by leading policy analysts and policymakers. The
workshop's findings are synthesized in Zaki, von Braun, and Teklu 1991.
120national institutions and foreign or domestic relief agencies in supplying informa-
tion, identifying the needy, and distributing food.
Macroeconomic Policies
Macroeconomic policies should be geared toward establishing a sound envi-
ronment where fiscal, monetary, trade, and exchange policies provide a framework
for reducing drought-hunger relationships. Policies should be comprehensive and
effective in dealing with structural problems and economic distortions in favor of
efficient resource allocation and sustained economic growth. Control of inflation is




Sustainable Growth in Traditional Rainfed Agriculture
The call for a broad-based strategy for development of rainfed agriculture,
which was initiated in a government study (Sudan, Ministry of Finance and Eco-
nomic Planning 1986), is central to a comprehensive famine-prevention strategy.
The government study defines the goals of rainfed agriculture: to promote
production to meet regional self-sufficiency and national self-reliance; to enhance
sustainable income and employment generation; and to conserve, rehabilitate, and
improve natural resources. Justifications for the pursuit of regional self-sufficiency
(particularly millet in the west) are based on recognition of current low levels of
infrastructure and market connections. The study recognizes constraints imposed
by low and variable unimodal rainfall, seasonal labor shortages, the shrinking
productive land base and declining soil productivity, and existing low-input farm
technology and managerial practices.
The present trends in traditional rainfed agriculture, with farmers resorting to
more subsistence farming, need to be reversed. The rural economy needs to move
toward monetization by improving farmgate prices of all crops, whether foodgrains
or cash crops, by opening up produce and input markets, and by improving rural
financial markets.
Rural Infrastructure
Available evidence reveals a low level of infrastructural development in Sudan,
especially in the west. Infrastructure development is a critical component in the
promotion of a stable and sustainable rainfed agriculture. Reduction in the cost of
transportation provides improved opportunity for mobility of goods and people. It
facilitates expansion of market outlets, enhances market integration, and reduces
the probability of market failure. Expansion of the transport network also facilitates
improved access to social overhead services (such as health, education, potable
water), which contributes to improved productivity and, consequently, to increased
income-generation capacity and improved nutritional status. Experience from other
countries also indicates the positive linkage effect of infrastructure development on
10A comprehensive discussion of these issues and their links to famine is presented in Atabani 1991
and is therefore not expanded here.
121expansion of rural services and diversification of the rural economy (IFPRI 1988).
Thus, expansion of infrastructure has potentially great short- and long-term bene-
fits to Sudan.
Public Works Programs
The provision of road infrastructure (in addition to water supply, reforestation,
and so forth) should occupy a central place in public works schemes. It must be
positioned where it has a great impact on providing a critical and catalytic link in
the development process. Under present cost constraints, this may mean giving
priority to areas of high agricultural potential. To promote employment and a
steady flow of income, the emphasis should be on labor-intensive techniques that
are tailored to the employment needs of the rural population. Such synchronization
of provision of work with the employment needs of those who seek employment
(wage rates presumably are set to attract the most needy) has the added advantage
of creating incentives to shift away from current employment practices with ad-
verse environmental effects (for example, cutting trees to make firewood and
charcoal). Such a practice of providing employment to the food-insecure to create
infrastructural assets could also be expanded in times of crisis to generate relief
employment to protect income and asset bases.
The main cost component in such infrastructure and employment-generating
schemes is payment for labor. Since the majority of the participants would come
from low-income families, they are expected to spend a large share df income on
food. Food payments as wage components can play a role, since, given the current
development of market infrastructure, market transaction costs to obtain food at the
marketplace are high. Food wages provide a more effective utilization of food aid
for development undertakings. This observation is derived from Sudan's experi-
ence in the 1980s, when, despite much-expanded food aid, little was used for
development projects.
Government policies need to be directed toward the eradication of absolute
rural poverty, which is the root cause of food insecurity. In addition to the eco-
nomic policies outlined above, special attention to areas frequently visited by
drought is required. Special employment and rural works programs that would
enhance rural incomes, reduce vulnerability to food shortages, improve the effi-
ciency of relief and rescue operations in case of need, and reduce environmental
hazards should be given top priority. Sudan already has some experience in such
programs, such as the International Labor Organization's labor-intensive project in
White Nile Province, where a rural work program helped with construction of rural
feeder roads, water supply, afforestation, and the like, and the Gum Arabic Re-
stocking Project, with headquarters in El Obeid, that exchanges food and basic
necessities for the commitment of rural people's land to be restocked with gum
arabic and worked with their family labor. In all of these efforts, replicability
should be an essential feature and measure of success.
Supply of Inputs
Traditional farming is spread over a vast area and in some cases may be located
hundreds of kilometers from input markets. The government may have to ensure
adequate and timely availability of these inputs at prices that farmers can afford.
Farm-input prices need not be heavily subsidized, but policy can affect prices by
122reducing transaction costs. But because of the vast farming area, the government
capability may be neither adequate nor most efficient in making these inputs
readily available; hence, there is room for the private sector to undertake a signifi-
cant role in the acquisition and distribution of farm inputs. In case the private sector
takes an active role in the farm-input trade, one of the measures that the govern-
ment can undertake to reduce transaction costs is the supplying of credit to the
farmers for input purchases.
Adaptive Research, Technological Packages, and Extension
There is an urgent need to bolster adaptive research efforts and to develop,
adopt, and continuously disseminate technologies based on existing knowledge and
practices that would enhance productivity, increase incomes, augment limited
inputs (land and water in particular), reduce, production variability due to low and
variable rainfall patterns, promote conservation of soil fertility, and curb environ-
mental degradation.
The emphasis should be on technological change to assist in reversing the
process of declining agricultural productivity. In the context of Sudan's low-re-
source and drought-prone areas, such a role entails the generation of technological
capacity to deal with low and variable rainfall, low soil fertility, seasonal shortages
of labor, and farmers' management practices. The bases of such a process lie in
improving the agronomic environment with existing technologies. Such technolo-
gies involve improvement in the structure, fertility, and water-holding capacity of
existing poor soils, particularly sandy soils in the arid regions, and increased
availability of water. However, technologies that focus on the existing knowledge
base of resource conservation have a limited capacity to achieve rapid agricultural
growth (Staatz 1986). It is imperative to move to high-input technology that uses
greater proportions of purchased inputs and fits into both the arid tropical environ-
ment and farmers' production-income-consumption strategies. But available on-
shelf technologies that are adapted or developed for the African environment are
limited at present (Matlon and Spenser 1984; Stoop et al. 1982). The strategy
should, therefore, realize the great challenge ahead and call for promotion of
research and development to ensure a sustained and viable development process.
The Jebel Marra experience in Darfur in 1984-85 also establishes a strong case
for increased access to agricultural technology, at least in high potential areas as a
start. Families with access to irrigation and improved production technology, such
as improved plows, have demonstrated a greater capacity to buffer periodic food
crises. This capacity has been enhanced through improvement in their level of food
production, income, and asset base. Moreover, in time of crisis, these areas have
greater capacities to transfer food or to provide employment for temporarily dis-
tressed migrants.
In the area of water conservation, attempts should be made to improve dry-
farming techniques and to introduce contour cultivation and drip irrigation. Water-
harvesting techniques, such as small dams in watershed areas like Jebel Marra and
heavy plowing of hard-crust Nagaa soils (caused by deposition of silt in water-
course deltas), seem ready for wider application. Recently, some serious steps were
undertaken to expand tubewell irrigation in Northern Kordofan basins that has
provided opportunities for perennial production of high-value crops like citrus and
vegetables, increasing incomes from agriculture and expanding employment.
123The development of technological packages in research centers is necessary but
not sufficient. Sufficiency would be partially met by the provision of efficient
agricultural extension services that would deliver these packages to the farmers in
good time and in acceptable forms. Such services are yet to be developed for
Sudanese agriculture or, in particular, for the traditional rainfed subsector. Apart
from the extension services provided by the Jebel Marra Rural Development
Project, there is hardly any extension service in operation in the traditional areas.
After the establishment of the adaptive research facility in western Sudan, serious
efforts should be undertaken toward development of extension services that would
disseminate the technology packages to farmers.
Protection of the Environment in Drought-Prone Areas
Preserving, promoting, and protecting the environment is fundamental to en-
hancing the future productive capacity of the drought-prone areas. Creeping deser-
tification and climatic change, increasing human and livestock population, impov-
erishment of the rural population, and past policy failures (most notably the rapid
expansion of large-scale mechanization into marginal and fragile areas, and the
choice of spatial distribution of water points in the arid and semi-arid zones) have
contributed to the degradation of the environment. It is essential that a strategy for
protecting the environment should call for policies that would modify the existing
common property rights system, provide incentives for voluntary resettlement of
the rural population, and align farmers' time preferences with society's preferences
by providing income support in times of stress. The latter measure is imperative for
slowing down rapid deforestation and encouraging the rural population to partici-
pate in protecting the environment.
Emergency Preparedness and Relief
The basic concept of famine preparedness entails a public commitment to
intervene effectively in time; to build institutional capacity at national, regional,
and local levels; to detect and diagnose indicators of distress; to prepare programs
and projects on a continuous basis; and to execute development and relief under-
takings in times of revealed needs. Such actions will increase the preparedness of
Sudan to meet emergency situations of localized or nationwide food shortages and
famines.
Buffer Stocks for Price Stabilization
Central to these actions is the development and efficient operation of a buffer
stock that would be located at storage facilities close to high-risk areas. The
stocking and the dissemination of grains require clear guidelines as to the eligible
groups, the period at which distribution commences, the price of grains for each
category within the eligible group, and the payment mode, whether in cash or in
kind, of public works.
No comprehensive data exist on the extent of stock-building in Sudan, particu-
larly in the private sector. The public stockholding policy was initiated in the
mid-1960s with the authorization of the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) to
maintain cereal buffer stocks, to stabilize support prices, and to make grain avail-
able in times of food shortage. The annual average size of ABS stock never
exceeded 10 percent of total cereal production in any season until 1984/85, owing
124to financial and storage constraints (Abdel Nour 1988). The delayed and limited
role of the government in providing relief food in 1984/85 was related to the lack
of both adequate food reserves and capacity to import. ABS stockpiling, however,
was greatly expanded in the aftermath of the 1984-85 famine. Issues that are likely
to loom in the future are determination of "optimum size," procurement and
release prices, and the extent of involvement in foreign trade for price stabilization.
Relief-Management and Early-Warning Systems
Relief management entails establishment by the government of a high-powered
system with a network extending to local, provincial, regional, and national levels.
The objective of such a relief system should be not only the supply and distribution
of food during shortages and famines, but also the prevention of famine in the first
place. Thus the relief institutions should establish a well-equipped (both in terms
of equipment and professional personnel who are highly motivated) early-warning
system with strong links to local governments and communities.
Strengthening Rural Health and Sanitation
A strong rural health system is a necessity under any circumstances and not just
from a famine-prevention perspective. The strong linkages between infrastructure
and health and sanitation in rural areas have been highlighted in this research. The
strengthening of rural health services is a key function of public investment for
human resource development. Not only does improved hygiene directly affect child
nutrition, it facilitates coping with drought-related consumption fluctuations. A
strengthened health-service system can be a powerful tool for managing relief more
effectively. Therefore, the quality of health services and the density of the network
in rural areas need to improve. Community participation and resources should not
be underestimated in molding an effective rural health system. The rural poor
appreciate the role of health services for survival and are willing to commit
resources. An effective, active system deals with the symptoms of chronic food
insecurity and thereby strengthens the capacity of the poor to survive transitory
food insecurity and the related health risks.
Legislation for Famine Prevention
For the relief institutions to operate efficiently, there is a need, first, to design
a well-structured relief legislation that would incorporate the basic relief policies
to which the government is fully committed. Second, in addition to promotion of
production and infrastructure bases, public policies should be concerned with
bridging any shortfalls in domestic production to meet food demands. Third,
dependence on food aid should be minimized, since factors other than humanitarian
considerations (such as world market situation and political leverage) play impor-
tant roles in its allocation. Hence, it is necessary to maintain adequate buffer stocks
or enhance the capacity to import or both. In the case of Sudan, policies of
stockholding and foreign trade have become more important because of increased
production shortfalls. Fourth, in the short term, relief policies should include
special programs for the most vulnerable segments of the population. Feeding
programs for children, infants, and their mothers to dissipate hunger and malnutri-
tion, and medical assistance to reduce the incidence of diarrhea and other epidem-
125ics, would strengthen these weak groups and improve their chances of survival in
the face of food shortages.
The relief legislation should detail the responsibilities of the national and
regional governments and the local authorities in identifying and declaring areas of
food shortages and famines and dissipating the impacts of these shortages and
famines. Each vulnerable locality should be obliged to maintain a certain amount
of grain in storage in accordance with a timetable drawn up on the basis of monthly
requirements, with a declining balance as the agricultural production season ad-
vances and a buildup in the same manner. The authorities at the local level would
be required to prepare periodically (weekly and monthly) a report that would
include detailed statistics and information on production, stocks, withdrawals, and
the number of people likely to be subject to malnutrition or starvation. The early-
warning system would, in addition to other information on rains and the like,
compile these data at the provincial and regional levels, analyze them, and present
a full report to the regional and central authorities with recommendations for
specific actions authorized by the legislation. The central authorities would make
public announcements about the situation and seek assistance, if necessary, from
the international community. Authorities, especially at the local level, would then
be entrusted with the field inspection of the relief work and assessment of the
effectiveness of the relief program.
Linkages between Relief and Rehabilitation
Relief and rehabilitation are integral to the development process. In the context
of drought-prone areas, where income levels are low and variable and famines are
recurrent, it is imperative to devise a strategy for protecting the development
process from going off track. Rehabilitation should be integrated into such a
process to ensure that no time is lost in getting back to the development process.
Sustenance of life in periods of emergency, and interventions to rehabilitate envi-
ronmental, community, and household assets and to enhance and protect household
incomes fall in the realm of development process. The critical link between re-
lief/rehabilitation and development lies in the choice of programs and projects
toward these ends. Information on the relative impact of these programs and
projects on sustained growth in food supply, employment and income, on modera-
tion of variation in production and income, and on protection of assets is vital for
selection of the optimal policy mix. This information represents an important area
that future research work should focus on in order to provide an empirical base to
assist policymakers in choosing efficient and effective projects that are optimal for
an integrated relief-rehabilitation-development framework.
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The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
The responses to the 1984-85 famine represent a great deal of regression from
the concepts and procedures embodied in the 1920 famine regulations. The key
omissions were a public policy initiative to detect and respond to famines, estab-
lishment of administrative institutions, and the linkage of relief to development.
The de-linking of relief from development has been, in fact, a typical feature of the
whole development approach since independence. The future lies in combining
these components and developing a flexible and efficient system of response to a
famine threat. The establishment of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
(RRC) represents a step in the right direction.
This commission was established in May 1985. It is an independent corporation
directly under the prime minister, with a board of directors and a ministerial
commissioner (Figure 15). Article 4 of the RRC Act states that "the objectives of
the Commission are to draw and implement policies, plans, and programs for
mitigating the effects of and rehabilitating areas affected by catastrophes, drought,
desertification, and degraded environmental orders, and to mobilize the necessary
international and local resources." The duties of the RRC are carried out in close
coordination and cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning,
which is the central government authority responsible for the country's socio-
economic development planning and budgeting.
The early-warning surveillance unit has been incorporated in the RRC since
March 1986. There are some similar units already operating in some of the techni-
cal ministries and autonomous organizations, such as the Ministry of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, and the Meteorol-
ogy Department in the Ministry of Defense. The early-warning unit of the RRC
does not collect data and, therefore, does not duplicate the data-gathering activities
of the technical ministries. It uses the data collected by these ministries to yield
indications about the approach of problematic situations.
The government Act relating to regulations for the work of NGOs in the
country was passed by the constitutional assembly only in early 1988. The Ministry
of Health and Social Welfare was authorized to register the NGOs. However, the
RRC still plays an important role in the coordination and technical supervision of
their work in the Sudan. This role requires a special unit in the RRC to monitor and
supervise the NGOs involved in relief and rehabilitation. This unit keeps appropri-
ate records on the credit potentials of the organizations and their sources of
funding.
The authority of the RRC Commissioner is delegated to the governor of each
region. At the same time, all governors are members of the board of directors of the
RRC. Each region has a regional relief committee headed by the governor, who
may delegate this authority to one of his or her senior officials. In this manner, the
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